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The AniBioThreat project was in 2010 awarded a 
grant by Directorate General Home Affairs under 
the programme “Prevention of and Fight Against 
Crime”. One issue stated in the call text in 2009 
under this programme was animal bioterrorism 
threats. The focus of AniBioThreat is therefore 
based on threats to living animals, animal feed 
and food of animal origin. As part of this, it is 
foreseen that the project will enhance inter-
national cooperation and promote networking for 
bridging security with animal and public health.
The objectives are furthermore based upon 
some of the identified actions in the EU Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
Action Plan (2009), the recommendations of the 
CBRN Task Force Report (2009) and especially 
the work that took place in the Biosubgroup 
threats to animal, and food and feed for animals 
(2008), and the Biosubgroup detection and 
diagnosis (2008, June).
The project is divided into the following six 
work packages (WPs); WP1 the establishment  
of a network between law enforcement, forensic 
institutes, first responders, intelligence, veterinary 
institutes, public health agencies and universities, 
WP2 threat assessment, WP3 early warning/
detection, WP4 European Laboratory Response 
Network for animal bio-terrorism threats, WP5 
detection and diagnostics and WP6 dissemination.
SPECIFIC ObjECTIvES OF ThE WPS  
ARE AS FOLLOWS:
• To facilitate effective international cooperation, 
improve training and establish a network 
between law enforcement, forensic institutes, 
first responders, intelligence agencies,  
veterinary institutes, public health agencies 
and universities (WP1).
• To improve monitoring and threat assessments 
(WP2).
• To investigate early warning and rapid alert 
for animal disease outbreaks caused by 
criminal acts (WP3).
• To establish a European Laboratory Response 
Network approach to counter animal bio-
terrorism threats (WP4).
• To enhance research and development of 
detection methods of animal diseases, such as 
anthrax, botulism and viral diseases caused 
by criminal acts (WP5).
• To disseminate the outcome of the project  
to relevant stakeholders through exercises, 
workshops, publications, and academic 
courses and to strengthen research through 
existing EU projects (WP6).
The overall objective of AnibioThreat is to improve  
the EU’s capacity to counter biological animal bioterrorism threats 
in terms of awareness, prevention and contingency.
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CAPACITy AND CAPAbILITy
The overall goal of the EU CBRN Action Plan is 
an all-hazards approach to reduce the threat of 
damage from CBRN incidents of accidental, 
natural or intentional origin, including acts  
of terrorism.
This deliverable has improved EU’s capacity 
and capability to counter biological animal 
bioterrorism threats in terms of awareness, 
prevention and contingency in following areas:
Education and training capacity and capability 
Research capability
Risk assessment capability 
Cooperation/interoperability capability
Surveillance and rapid alert capability 
Diagnostic and laboratory response  
network capacity and capability
Forensic awareness capability 
Contingency planning capability
Joint exercise capacity 
Readiness assessment and  
medical countermeasure capacity
Communication and information sharing capability
Strategic, tactical and operational  
decision making capability
AbSTRACT
The exchange of knowledge between experts 
from different organizations and disciplines is 
essential for strategic planning and decision 
making. The activities in task 1.1 had an inte-
grative role in this project. The main objective 
was to exhange knowledge and facilitate coordi-
nation of activities in different tasks. In addition 
the multidisciplinary network of task 1.1 has 
been essential for the construction of scenarios for 
workshops and exercises.The work was divided 
in two main parts: (i) collection and analysis of 
terms and definitions and (ii) construction of 
scenarios and contribution to planning and 
conduction of workshops and exercises.
In the first part, terms were collected, and 
analyzedwith the help from the Swedish Centre 
of Terminology (TNC). The CBRN area has roots 
in multiple disciplines and the analysis of terms 
showed that the project partners use various 
international standards and that many terms 
occur in several documents without being 
properly defined anywhere. Furthermore the 
analysis showed that the pragmatics of the terms, 
that is how they are used in different contexts, 
are as important as the definitions. In particular 
it is important to recognize when the usage of a 
term is implicitly referring to a protocol or legal 
framework and references to updated source 
documents would be an important component  
of a term database.
In the second part, a set of scenarios was 
constructed that was used as working examples 
in lectures and workshops, exercises and scientific 
studies. The joint work on scenario construction 
was found to be an efficient way of building 
networks between partners and disciplines and 
involved several other persons than those which 
were finally trained. Thus we conclude that 
scenario activities at an EU level should not focus 
on construction of prefabricated scenarios but 
rather on supporting local scenario construction 
for example by promoting exchange of personnel. 
The construction of scenarios should be appre-
ciated as an important networking activity to 
exercises. To facilitate this concept for scenario 
construction and a toolbox including checklists 
and scenario skeletons could be valuable. A set  
of scenarios were used to assess the applicability 
of forensic statistics to biocrime investigations 
and Bayesian belief networks (BBN) were found 
to be a useful tool for combining evidence from 
different types of investigations, such as forensic 
entomology, witness statements and type match-
ing of DNA fingerprints. Although some scenario 
were too complex to be fully represented as a 
BBN the model building appears to be a useful 
way of structuring data and uncertainties and to 
identify relevant reference population and 
critical parameters and to promote informed 
decision making during the investigation.
DELIvERAbLE ACCORDING TO  
GRANT AGREEMENT
A report on definitions and conceptual models. 
DESCRIPTION OF DELIvERAbLE
This deliverable consists of a report describing 
the work and results that has been undertaken  
in task 1.1 during the course of the AniBioThreat 
project. Since task 1.1 is a horizontal task many 
of the activities have been performed in collabo-
ration with other tasks in AniBioThreat or 
occasionally with external projects. The main 
document contains a summary of activities and 
results whereas more extensive reports from 
different activites are provided as appendices.
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bRIDGING STATEMENT 
In order to reach the goals of AniBioThreat it is 
necessary to bring together expertise from a wide 
range of disciplines. Knowledge and information 
from all actors must be collected and summarized 
in order to support other activities in the project, 
such as scenario development, workshops and 
exercises, as well as threat assessment, diagnostics 
and the creation of response plans. A major 
obstacle is that the terminology used varies 
between disciplines and professions. Thus in order 
to create joint situation awareness it is necessary 
to acknowledge the various definitions. 
Definitions of terms and concepts is not 
sufficient to achieve efficient communication 
between disciplines since the terms point at 
implicit knowledge about processes, organizational 
structures, legal frameworks etc that is essential 
for understanding. Visualization of knowledge 
and the construction of illustrative scenarios are 
important tools for bridging the knowledge gaps.
LINK TO EU CbRN ACTION PLAN
The exchange of knowledge between experts 
from different organizations and disciplines is 
essential for strategic planning and decision 
making. Mechanisms and tools for exchanging 
knowledge and creation of a joint situation 
awareness including joint definitions, conceptual 
modelling and visualization are necessary for 
several Biological and Horizontal Actions of  
the EU CBRN Action Plan (1) including: 
B.11 Member States together with the Commission 
should set minimum requirements for 
sampling, detection, identification and 
monitoring of pathogens and toxins within  
a civilian security context at the EU level 
and make these requirements available to 
the private sector, if appropriate, subject to 
applicable requirements on confidentiality. 
This action is linked with recommendation 148 
of the report from the CBRN task force (2).
H.1 The Member States together with the 
Commission should establish and regularly 
update EU lists of:
 – high-risk chemical agents;
 – high risk biological agents and toxins;
 –  high-risk radioactive sources;
 of special security concern. The lists should be 
developed through a joint effort involving 
various actors, with scientific and security 
expertise from the Member States, the 
Commission Europol, Eurojust, and relevant 
international organisations. These lists 
should be based on a risk assessment 
analysis and should take account of existing 
relevant lists, including those developed by 
other international organisations. The work 
should include an agreement on the criteria 
and method to be used for establishing and 
applying such lists, including quantitative 
thresholds where appropriate. This action is 
linked with recommendation 1 of the report 
from the CBRN task force (2).
H.17 The Member States together with the 
Commission should encourage public 
authorities to provide, as appropriate, 
adequate security information to the entire 
supply chain of high-risk CBRN materials, 
first responders (police, fire-departments, 
medical services, other special units as 
needed) and educational establishments to 
focus attention on issues of concern. This 
action is linked with recommendation 14  
of the report from the CBRN task force (2).
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OThER RELEvANT ACTIONS
B.9 The Member States together with the  
Commission should define;
- sets of relevant simulants of biological 
agents for field tests, practical exercises 
and field technology trialling at national 
level and EU level, where appropriate;
- criteria for method validation across 
detection of human, animal and crop threats.
H.22 The Member States together with the 
Commission should develop a mechanism 
for information exchange among Member 
States on methodologies of scenario develop-
ment related to sampling and detection.  
The Commission should prepare an over-
view of Member State activities in this area. 
The Commission will support, as far as 
required, the exchange of further information 
by those Member States wishing to do so, 
taking appropriate confidentiality require-
ments into account.
CONTRIbUTION TOWARDS  
OvERALL ObjECTIvE OF ANIbIOThREAT
The activities in this task had an integrative role 
in the project. The main objective was to create 
joint situation awareness between project partners 
and to facilitate coordination of activities in 
different tasks and between partners of different 
fields of expertise. 
The multidisciplinary network of Task 1.1 has 
been essential for the construction of scenarios 
used in activities in other tasks including work-
shops, exercises and evaluation of evidence in 
relation to detection and identification.
TASK LEADER 
Gunnar Andersson (SVA)
TASK PARTNERS 
ANSES, BfR, CVI, DTU, IFR, ISS, RPS, SJV, SKL, 
SLU, SVA, ULUND.
AUThORS OF ThIS REPORT 
• Gunnar Andersson (SVA)
• Katharina Tomuzia (BfR)
• Charlotta Löfström (DTU)
• Oskar Karlsson (SLU)
AIM
The aims of task 1.1. were:
• To generate consensus of definitions and 
conceptual modeling that could be used for 
other tasks and activities in the project. 
• To collect the information needed for making 
strategic decisions in the project.
• To generate joint situation awareness  
about aims of the project and the models/
documents/guidelines that should be  
delivered in different tasks.
 
bACKGROUND
In order to reach the goals of AniBioThreat, it is 
necessary to bring together expertise from a wide 
range of disciplines. Knowledge and information 
from all actors had to be collected and summarized 
in order to support other activities in the project 
such as scenario development, threat assessment, 
modelling and training. In order to accomplish 
this work the task was divided in two main 
parts: (i) collection and analysis of terms and 
definitions and (ii) construction of scenarios and 
contribution to planning and conduction of 
workshops and exercises (Figure 1).
In order to reduce the threat from bioterrorism 
and to coordinate the response to an attack 
communication, including risk-, incident- and 
crisis-communication between disciplines is 
critical. Employees at organizations from various 
sectors are educated and trained in different 
disciplines, such as agricultural science, bio-
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chemistry, criminology, food science, forensic 
science, juridical science, mathematics, medicine, 
microbiology, and veterinary medicine. From 
education and experience the professionals have 
adopted the professional terminology and jargon 
of their discipline as well as social codes and 
conventions of their professional culture. When 
communicating across disciplinary boundaries 
the differences in understanding and inter-
pretation of terms and concepts may result in 
misunderstandings. The use of conflicting 
terminology may also be problematic for decision 
makers and communicators who may lack the 
expert knowledge to detect that experts from 
different disciplines use the same term or word 
to talk about different things. This may result in 
Figure 1. Horizontal activities in AniBioThreat. Activities includes workinggroups  
for terms and definitions and construction of scenarios for workshops and exercises.
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miscommunication and can impair the ability  
to prevent or handle an incident. Misunder-
standings due to differences in terminology may be 
particularly detrimental in emergency situations 
to support communication in the fight against 
bioterrorism which requires cooperation between 
organizations from science, biosafety and law 
enforcement. It will thus be necessary to find 
mechanisms to cope with conflicting terminologies 
and to adopt joint definitions of key concepts.
The structured collection, representation and 
visualization of knowledge about for example 
threats, vulnerabilities and capabilities will be 
essential for the risk assessment based establish-
ment of lists of high-risk agents (Action H1) and 
for the establishment of criteria for such lists as 
well as for the communication of security 
information. 
Understanding of concepts and processes  
is essential for communication within a project  
as well as in a crisis situation. Joint definitions  
of terms is only a small step towards better 
communication since terms do not only represent 
a defined concept but also point at other implicit 
knowledge underlying the information in the 
message (3). For example an epidemiologist, a 
laboratory technician or a police officer being 
asked to perform a risk or threat assessment 
would not only rely on an implicit definition of 
the term but also on implicit knowledge on the 
protocol to use and the delimitations of the 
mandate. In order to correctly understand a 
message and to create awareness of a situation  
it is necessary to process a large quantity of 
background information including organizational 
structures, legal frameworks, causal relations 
and process flows. In this situation bridging 
exercises and seminars as well as comprehensive 
visual representation of knowledge and good 
illustrative examples becomes invaluable.
Scenarios are an important tool for contingency 
planning in general and for reaching the goals of 
the AniBioThreat project. They are needed for the 
planning of exercises, developing and challenging 
response plans, assessing vulnerabilities and 
setting work priorities. Thus, the network of task 
1.1 was used to support the development of a set 
of contamination scenarios for use in different 
tasks. Additionally the collective construction of 
realistic and relevant scenarios is an activity that 
involves expertise from all organizations and  
disciplines represented in the project and the 
scenarios were expected to be a powerful tool  
to establish networks and to increase the under-
standing or the work in other organizations and 
fields of expertise. 
METhODOLOGy
Collection and Analysis of Terms & Definitions
Terms were collected, from a varied set of subject 
experts. Each new record was decomposed into 
several fields that included the term and its 
definition, source reference etc. The lists were 
imported into a MySQL 5.1.41 database  
(Oracle Corporation CA, www.mysql.com)  
and made accessible online using php tools  
(phpMyAdmin 3.3.2. www.phpmyadmin.net).  
A description of the database including a tutorial 
and login information was prepared in the form 
of a slide show (Appendix 1). The term relation-
ships were included in separate fields for generic 
relations (IS A), partitive relations (Part OF) and 
associative relations (IS RELATED TO) (Figure 2). 
Terms were analyzed with assistance from the 
Swedish Centre for Terminology in Solna, Sweden 
(TNC) (www.tnc.se/the-swedish-centre-for-
terminology.html) and the result from their work 
was presented in a separate report (Appendix 2). 
The report from TNA was followed up in a 
workshop where participants from different 
organizations (SVA, CVI, SMI, SJV, SLU and DTU) 
sought to agree on joint definitions of concepts 
related to risk/threat/hazard and analysis/
management. (Appendix 3).
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Figure 2. Example of concept diagram with generic (angle), 
partitive (tree) and associative (arrow) relations. The 
concepts biosafety and biosecurity are part of biorisk 
management which is associated with biorisk. The concept 
biorisk is a risk which in turn is associated with the concepts 
hazard and likelihood.
The following terminology was used in the 
analysis:
object – anything perceivable or conceivable
concept – unit of knowledge created by a unique 
combination of characteristics 
term – verbal designation of a general concept  
in a specific subject field 
definition – representation of a concept by  
a descriptive statement which serves to 
differentiate it from related concepts 
operational definition – defines something  
(e.g. a variable, term, or object) in terms of the 
specific process or set of validation tests used 
to determine its presence and quantity  
(from Wikipedia. The term was introduced  
in the discussion about definitions for risk 
and biorisk)
characteristic – abstraction of a property of an 
object or of a set of objects. Characteristics are 
used for describing concepts.
Terms are not always single words but may be 
simple (e.g. risk), compound (e.g. biorisk) or 
multiword (e.g. risk assessment) terms.
Identifying scenario needs
The needs for scenarios in the project were 
investigated through a series of workshops and 
seminars. The work was initiated with a table top 
exercise at the AniBioThreat Kick Off meeting 
(Appendix 4) which was followed up by a session 
at the first WP1 meeting and the first annual 
meeting. In addition, a survey was sent to project 
members to identify the need for scenarios in 
different tasks. Based on this work a conceptual 
framework for scenarios was developed together 
with templates/check-lists for scenario develop-
ment. (Appendix 5).
Construction of scenarios  
for exercises and workshops 
An important distinction in the scenario con-
struction was between core scenearios and user 
scenarios. In the project a core scenario was defined 
as a set of preconditions (epidemiological potential 
of agent etc) that sets the «rules» for the develop-
ment of the scenario. In addition the core scenario 
contains a description of the series of events 
taking place. The core scenario constructed in the 
project are summarized in Appendix 6. In contrast 
a user scenario is constructed with particular aims 
and goals which is typically to train or study  
one or several capabilities. While being based  
on a core scenario it contains extra information 
which is specific for the planned activity. The 
user scenarios constructed in the project are 
summarized in Appendix 7.
The scenario construction was lead by a core 
team consisting of modeller and one or a few 
experts such as police men, epidemiologists and 
pathologists with experience of handling related 
incidents. The initial step was to define the aims 
and goals of the work using the “user scenario 
template” in the AniBioThreat conceptual 
framework for scenario building (Appendix 5). 
The first parameters to decide upon was the 
capabilities/skills that the scenario should 
challenge. After the aims were set appropriate 
core scenarios were created or selected from an 
excisting set. 
The scenarios were updated in an iterative 
process including interviews with experts on the 
agent, epidemiological work and police work, 
risk
biorisk 
biosafety biosecurity
biorisk 
management hazard
likelihood
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biosafety etc., until it fulfilled the specification 
and was plausable and credible enought to 
stimulate a good discussion. The construction 
also included studying of case reports and 
scientific papers on the agent in question. In this 
process many of the attributes of the core scenario, 
including biological agents, target species, and 
route of dissemination were changed until the 
scenario fullfilled the criteria with respect to 
challenges, realism and availability of data.  
The scenarios were represented as a slide show 
including background information, fact cards with 
data from sampling and typing, observations 
and results from investigations and finally the 
key to what happened. 
During 2012 a set of forensic scenarios were 
developed with the aim of evaluating Bayesian 
Belief Networks and forensic statistics as a 
concept for expressing causal relationships and 
uncertainty in expert reports. The scenarios were 
used as working examples in lectures and work - 
shops (Appendix 7) as well as for research (4, 5).
Exercises and workshops 
During table top exercises (Appendix 8) and 
workshops (Appendices 9, 10) the participants 
were introduced to the aims and goals of scena-
rio work. Subsequently, they were presented in a 
slide show containing background information 
to the scenario and the initial events. Additional 
slides representing injects were presented during 
the course of the exercise. As the scenario 
proceeded the participants were asked frequently 
about several issues such as:
– What might have caused the scenario?
– How would the people (depending on their power  
of decision) react to the situation?
– How would the organization the participants  
are working in react and cope with the scenario 
(further steps, procedural instructions etc.)? 
Analyzing forensic scenarios
Forensic scenarios based on real incidents were 
constructed in a collaborative process involving 
experts from several disciplines including 
epidemiology, veterinary pathology, feed safety 
and forensic science. Two workshops were held 
at SVA, Uppsala in January and September 2012 
(Appendices 9, 10). The scenarios were presented  
in the format of a slideshow. The workshop 
participants, representing the various scientific 
disciplines were asked to list possible hypotheses 
and the sources of information that would be 
used to test them. Afterwards, the information 
was structured as a Bayesian Belief Network in  
a collective process using the software GeNie 2.0 
(Decisions Systems Laboratory, Univ. Pittsburgh).
When constructing the network guesstimates of 
the parameters of the different modelswere 
provided by the groups of participating experts.
The draft network that resulted from the 
workshop was further elaborated in an iterative 
process where the statistician modified the 
network based on input from domain experts 
and the parameter guesstimates were updated 
based on scientific data. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Terms and definitions  
– construction of a term database
The collection of terms resulted in a database of 
in total 683 distinct terms (Effective: Oct 23 2012) 
proposed by one or several parties. For 401 of 
these terms at least one English definition was 
found. Storage of terms and definitions in an 
SQL database was found to be superior to text 
files of spread sheets for managing the term 
collection. The format supports the use of SQL  
to perform customized queries that include 
associated terms and synonyms or restrict the 
query to a particular source or context.
The example SQL query below returns the 
term name, author, relations, synonyms and 
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definition of all entries which are either named 
animal bioterrorism or listed as related to animal 
bioterrorism. 
SELECT `TERM` , `AUTHOR` , `IS A` , `IS PART OF` ,  
`IS ASSOCIATED WITH` , `ENGLISH SYNONYM  
ABBREVIATION` , `DEF ENGLISH`
FROM `term database`
WHERE `TERM` like ’%animal%bio%terrorism%’
OR `IS A` like ’%animal%bio%terrorism%’  
OR `IS PART OF` like ’%animal%bio%terrorism%’  
OR `IS ASSOCIATED WITH` like 
’%animal%bio%terrorism%’
OR `ENGLISH SYNONYM ABBREVIATION` like 
’%animal%bio%terrorism%’
ORDER BY ’AUTHOR’
The query in this example will in addition to 
animal bioterrorism return information for agro-
terrorism, bioterrorism and animal-bioterrorism 
threat. A screenshot illustrating searching and 
editing of terms is shown in Figure 3 whereas a  
more detailed description of the database is 
given in Appendix 1.
SQL was found to be a useful means for 
retrieving and sorting terms based on not only 
name but also features like related terms, syno-
nyms and acronyms. In a terminology or glossary 
project it may be accessed directly for example 
via a web interface but it could also be used as an 
external resource for term banks or web based 
glossaries and reference management tools. 
However, the construction of such a database 
through copying from source documents was 
laborious and introduces errors due to human-
mistakes and the presence of invisible special 
characters. It also became evident that the data - 
base would rapidly be out of date unless the 
organizations behind the source documents 
continuously submit and update their own term 
posts in a repository similar to e.g. genebank 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/).  
Curation of the database will be another  
important issue. In practice it will most likely 
require too much time and resources to be 
performed by the database owner. Thus it will 
probably be necessary that each term post has  
an owner responsible for the curation and that 
maintainance is secured by linking ownership  
of each post to a permanent organisation of 
function rather than individuals or projects. 
Terms and definitions  
– analyzing the definitions
The analysis of collected terms and their sources 
showed that the project partners use various 
international standards in their area of expertise 
(Appendices 3, 4). The same term often represented 
different concepts in the diverse standards from 
different sectors or alternatively distinct terms 
were used to represent the same or a very similar 
concept. According to general  terminology, 
theory definitions apply to concepts and a word 
becomes a term only when the concept behind 
the term is clearly delimited (3). Among the 
terms analyzed in the project, this approach to 
terminology seemed to work mainly for terms 
representing physical objects (substances, 
organisms, samples etc.) and their measurements 
(concentrations, detection limits). In contrast,  
the terms referring to objectives, procedures or 
activities (e.g. biosecurity, threat assessment and 
risk management) could often be defined in this 
way only as part of a specific protocol or method. 
Furthermore TNC observed that many of the 
terms in the list cover concepts that occur in a 
large number of documents but which are not 
properly defined anywhere. Therefore, the 
selection of the best definition can require a very 
thorough analysis of the concept in question and 
not in isolation but with regard to other related 
concepts and preferably together with a group  
of experts in the field (Appendix 3).
13
WP1: NETWORK AND TRAINING   TASK 1.1: TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL MODELLING
Figure 3. Screenshot 
from AniBioThreat term 
database. The example 
shows the first part of the 
list of terms retrieved 
when searching for “risk 
assessment” in the field 
“term” as well as in fields 
representing the generic, 
partitive and associative 
relations. One entry for 
“hazard characterization” 
is marked for editing.
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The workshop held in December 2011 focused  
on definitions of terms related to hazard, risk 
and threat and the management thereof. The 
difficulties of defining terms in the bioterror  
area are illustrated in the following examples. 
hazard: Was found to be relatively easy to define, 
for example as “an accidental or naturally 
occurring phenomenon with the potential to 
cause physical or psychological harm to 
humans including loss of life, damage or 
losses of property, and/or disruption to the 
environment or to structures (economic social, 
political) upon which a community’s way of 
life depends”. Alternative phrasings were 
discussed, most of which were considered 
acceptable. The definitions were generally not 
“operational”, that is hazard was not defined 
by how it is measured. Thus, a hazard was 
viewed as a phenomenon, which might have 
consequences. In this view it is the severity of 
the consequences which may be measured, 
not the hazard itself.
Risk: Most of the definitions found were ope rational 
definitions in the form of a mathe matical 
expression. In different contexts the term risk 
was defined as “the likelihood/probability  
of a harmful event” (6), “a combination of 
probability and severity” (7) or sometimes  
a “combination of threat, consequences and 
vulnerability”. However, it was noted that the 
term risk can be used in a qualitative sense as 
in “Which are the risks?” as well as quantita-
tive sense as in “How big is the risk?”. It was 
discussed whether or not there is a conceptual 
difference between risk as a “phenomenon” 
and risk in an operational sense.
Threat: The definition according to the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk 
lexicon (8) is “natural or man-made occurrence, 
individual, entity, or action that has or indicates 
the potential to harm life, information, 
operations, the environment and/or property”. 
However, the concept analysis revealed that 
threat with this definition may actually refer 
to several concepts including 1) indicated 
threats, 2) intentional threats and 3) natural 
threats. The workshop identified a difference 
between authorities from different disciplines 
regarding which of these concepts are referred 
to when threats are discussed.
biorisk: An analysis of the concept biorisk 
indicated a problem with defining the term. 
The only definitions so far for biorisk is in  
the WHO biorisk management standard (9) 
where it is defined as: “The probability or 
chance that a particular adverse event (in the 
context of this document: accidental infection 
or unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, 
diversion or intentional release), possibly 
leading to harm, will occur” and in the CEN 
workshop agreement on Laboratory Biorisk 
Management Standard (CWA15793, Feb 2008) 
“combination of the probability of occurrence 
of harm and the severity of that harm  
where the source of harm is a biological  
agent or toxin”. 
In the workshop it was discussed whether  
the “operational” definitions (probability or 
proba bility x consequence) would be useful for 
defining the concept biorisk since the term biorisk 
is primarily used to discuss risks in a qualitative 
manner as in “identify the biorisk(s)” or control 
the biorisk. It was observed that in practice the 
term biorisk (if at all a term) is used in a wide 
sense where the narrow operational definition 
may not be applicable. This is also reflected by an 
alternative definition of biorisk from the home-
page of De Norske Veritas (DNV) where it is stated 
that: ”Biorisk can be defined as the application  
of risk management in areas where the principal 
hazard is a biological agent”(10). However, in the 
sense biorisk is used by DNV it appears to be 
used as a short form for biorisk management.
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One group suggested discarding biorisk as a 
term whereas the other group wished to keep  
it resulting in two different concept systems 
(Figure 4). The concepts system in Figure 4, right, 
where biorisk management is associated with 
risk management and biohazard would result in 
a definition similar to the before mentioned 
definition of biorisk of DNV.
During the workshop terms and concepts 
related to risk assessment and risk management 
were discussed in two groups consisting of 
persons with different professional background. 
In one group the terms were discussed in the 
context of the Laboratory Biorisk Management 
Standard. The resulting concept diagram, with 
definitions, is indicated in Figure 5. In the second 
group dominated by persons working with food 
safety and animal health there was a consensus to 
follow the terminology of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC) (11) resulting in the concept 
diagram of Figure 6. Similar definitions are used 
by the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) (12) although in that terminology hazard 
identification is considered a separate stage 
preceding risk assessment (not shown). A 
comparison between Figures 5 and 6 reveals that 
risk management as defined by CAC is a very 
narrow definition which may be applicable to  
the specific context of the procedures for scientific 
risk analysis. Risk management as used in this 
context refers to setting the appropriate level of 
protection based on political, economic and other 
considerations. Risk management in this sense in 
this sense is only a small part of risk management 
in general. However it could perhaps be seen as 
the part of risk management which is included in 
the analysis of risk. Similar the term risk analysis 
according to the Laboratory Biorisk Management 
Standard is extremely narrow compared with  
risk analysis according to CAC and the terms 
refers to different concepts. 
These examples illustrate the problems 
associated with definitions lists and glossaries in 
the CBRN field. A fixed glossary might be agreed 
upon within one domain. However, in a multi 
disciplinary context the same term will in many 
cases have been defined differently in other 
domains and may sometimes refer to different 
Figure 4: Example of outcome from the Terminology workshop. Two alternative concept systems for biorisk management were 
proposed. Left: In this system biorisk is considered a term representing a well-defined concept. Right: In this system biorisk is 
not considered a well-defined term. Instead biorisk management is defined as risk management associated with biohazards.
risk
biorisk 
biorisk 
management 
hazard biohazard
likelihood
risk
biorisk 
management 
risk management
hazard
biohazard
likelihood
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Figure 5. Diagram of concepts related to management and analysis 
of risks in the in the context of the Biorisk Management Standard.
Risk management 
systematic approach to 
identifying, addressing and 
reducing risks and 
threats…
Risk communication
interactive exchange of 
information and opinions 
throughout the risk 
management process …
Risk assessment
overall process of 
risk/threat
identification, 
risk/threat analysis
and risk/threat
evaluation
Risk analysis
process to 
comprehend the 
nature of risk/threat 
and to determine 
the level of 
risk/threat 
Risk preparedness
/response
Risk identification
process of finding, 
recognizing and 
describing risks 
and threats
Risk evaluation
process of 
comparing the 
results of risk 
analysis with risk 
criteria…
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Figure 6. Diagram 
of concepts related 
to management and 
analysis of risks 
according to the 
Codex Alimentarius 
Commission working 
principles.
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concepts. The definitions lists from different 
domains typically originate from influential 
sources such as the Codex Alimentarius of the 
WHO or the US Department of Homeland 
Security. When attempting to provide a joint 
definition there is a risk of ending up with a very 
broad definition that does not clarify in what 
sense the term is used in a specific document.
Since the CBRN area has roots in multiple 
disciplines, with evolving terminology it may not 
be realistic to achieve unequivocal communication 
through a standardized vocabulary and joint 
definitions for words from common language. 
Thus a communication strategy should include 
awareness of alternative definitions and the 
ability to talk and write without relying on the 
implicit knowledge. Cross disciplinary commu-
nication skills should be part of the training of 
personnel in the CBRN field. In addition, a 
searchable repository of terms and definition 
from relevant organizations and authorities would 
be a valuable addition to existing glossaries. 
The outcome of the work on terms and 
definitions has been compiled in a manuscript (13) 
and submitted to the AniBioThreat supplement 
in the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science.
A framework for scenarios
A conceptual framework for structured description 
of scenarios was developed in collaboration with 
task 4.2 creating templates for specifying core 
scenarios and user scenarios. The result was 
described in a previous report (Appendix 5).  
An important step forward was to explicitly 
distinguish between the description of the events 
that defines the scenario (core scenario) and the 
description of the requirements of the scenario  
in relation to a planned activity e.g. an exercise 
(user scenario).
Construction of scenarios
During the first year of the project several core 
scenarios of various complexity were constructed 
(Appendix 6). The scenarios were selected to 
cover the most important agents studied in WP5 
(Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum and 
viruses including highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI), as well as challenging different 
capabilities including biosafety, biosecurity, 
forensics, early warning and first responders. 
The core scenarios were intended to be used as 
starting points for the development of different 
user scenarios with specific demands to serve 
activities in other tasks (Appendix 7). 
Scenario based activities
Scenarios were used in various activities in  
the project including workshops, exercises and 
research activities. For each activity the work 
started with the definition of a user scenario 
determining the desired properties of the scenario 
after which the core scenario was either selected 
from the set of existing scenarios or constructed 
from scratch. A summary of the activities to-
gether with references to original reports are 
summarized in Appendix 7.
Scenarios for forensics
The work on forensic evaluation of evidence was 
initiated by a workshop in January 2012 focusing 
on a scenario involving the tracing of Salmonella 
in a suspected feed-borne outbreak (Appendix 9). 
The work was further elaborated through the 
analysis of an authentic case. The resulting net - 
work model was presented at the International 
Symposium Salmonella and Salmonellosis (I3S) in 
Saint-Malo (France) in May 2013 (5) and is planned 
to be included in a prospective publication. 
A second workshop in September 2012 focused 
on the evaluation of evidence in pathology cases 
involving suspected poisoning of animals (Appen-
dix 10). As part of the outcome a Bayesian Belief 
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Network (BBN) was constructed that illustrates 
how results from different investigations can be 
used to infer the cause of death (Figure 7). 
However the participants concluded that in this 
scenario neither the sets of hypotheses nor the 
different observed results could be considered 
independent and may be difficult to represent 
correctly as a BBN. It was noticed that the 
process of a veterinary pathology investigation 
had similarities with that of e.g. an investigation 
of a fire where new hypotheses and pieces of 
evidence are added stepwise. A scenario focusing 
on the interpretation of negative results in the 
investigation of an intentional release of anthrax 
was used in a tabletop exercise with staff wor-
king in a BSL-3 laboratory (Appendix 8). 
The joint work on scenario construction was 
found to be an efficient way of building networks 
between partners and disciplines and may 
involve other persons than those which should be 
trained. The scenario workshop format was also 
useful for introducing new concepts including 
statistical analysis of sampling results. Since the 
involvement of different actors in the scenario 
building process was found to be crucial for 
reaching the goals it may be questioned if a 
database of ready-to-use scenarios would be 
beneficial for the preparedness at EU level. 
However, the skeleton of the scenarios may be 
used as a starting-point for developing customized 
scenarios that are representative for the local 
agricultural practices, infrastructure and organi-
zation of companies and authorities. In this 
context, the essence of a scenario is the type of 
decision that should be made, the type of infor-
mation that should be interpreted and the 
challenges faced. Relevance and realism of the 
scenario are important for the motivation of 
participants and the agent and target should be 
selected with regard to these facts. A concept for 
scenario construction and a toolbox including 
checklists and scenario skeletons could be 
valuable for improving the preparedness against 
bioterrorism.
Presenting scientific evidence to a court or 
decision maker is different from writing scientific 
publications and most scientists have never 
participated in a forensic investigation. At the 
same time, forensic components in exercises have 
been lacking (14). Both the development of good 
Figure 7. Simplified representation of the BBN constructed during the workshop in evaluation of evidence 
in cases involving veterinary pathology and chemistry (Appendix 10).  
Left: Network with prior probabilities before adding evidence. Right: Network after adding evidence.
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forensic scenarios and conduction/evaluation of 
exercises take time and resources and are not 
activities typically funded by research projects. 
Consequently there is a need for funding and 
encouragement for researchers and students  
to learn and train evaluation of evidence. The 
experience from the AniBioThreat project indicates 
that the forensic approach to presenting scientific 
evidence and the associated uncertainties would 
be valuable also when presenting results to 
decision makers and risk managers in other 
contexts. Thus, adopting a common approach for 
the presentation of evidence/results in forensic 
reports and normal expert statements could 
potentially result in better decision support to 
risk managers as well as a better preparedness  
to conduct forensic investigation of bio-crimes. 
Building statistical models and generating 
scientific data is only one step towards improved 
capacity in microbial forensics. Equally important 
is to train scientists and decision makers in forensic 
work. In addition, several important knowledge 
gaps relate to the communication process itself. 
Examples of this are how the evaluation process 
works in practice under different scenarios and 
how the reports and statements are perceived by 
the client. In order to build a capacity in forensic 
microbiology it will thus be necessary to apply 
an iterative approach including education, 
exercises and research (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Building up a capacity in forensic microbiology 
The ability to combine circumstantial evidence 
from very different types of investigations, such 
as forensic entomology, witness statements and 
matching of DNA fingerprints makes the BBN a 
promising tool for creating joint situation aware-
ness during the investion of CBRN incidents. 
However, as noticed in the analysis of the 
pathology case some scenarios may be difficult 
to be represented as a Bayesian Network.  
Nevertheless the model building appears to be a 
useful way of structuring data and uncertainties, 
to identify relevant reference population and 
critical parameters and to promote informed 
decision making during the investigation.
 
CONCLUSIONS
The activities in Task 1.1 had an integrative role 
within this project. The main objective was to 
create joint situation awareness between partners 
in the project and to facilitate coordination of 
activities in different tasks. Therefore, it is not 
focused on a single action in  the EU CBRN Action 
Plan. However, the results from the work have 
contributed to the fulfilment of several actions:
B11 The cross disciplinary work in tasks 1.1, 4.2 
and 4.3 has introduced a logical framework 
for evaluation of evidence in microbial 
forensics and veterinary microbiology. The 
framework was introduced to laboratory 
staff and decision makers through scenario 
workshops (Appendices 9 and 10) and a pilot 
exercise (Appendix 8). Analysis of additional 
forensic microbiology scenarios will offer 
means to evaluate how well a detection 
method performs in terms of value of 
evidence and thus contribute to the setting 
of minimum requirements for sampling, 
detection, identification and monitoring of 
pathogens and toxins.
Research
&
Development
Education 
& 
Training
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&
Networking
Evaluation
& 
Planning
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H1 The collection and representation of know-
ledge on e.g. threats, vulnerabilities and 
capabilities is essential for the risk-assess-
ment based establishment of lists of high 
risk agents and for the establishment of 
criteria for such lists. This includes for 
example conceptual understanding of risks 
threats vulnerabilities and a contribution to 
vulnerability assessment conducted within 
AniBioThreat task 2.1. Exercises such as 
“Insider” conducted in task 4.1 (Task 4.1 
Appendix 1) which involves decision makers 
will be an important tool for understanding 
how the criteria would be interpreted and 
applied. It is recommended that decision 
making relating to high risk lists should be 
studied in tabletop exercises focusing on for 
example theft of contagious material and 
threat assessment and involving decision 
makers from different organizations and 
member states. The setting of definitions  
for terms used in a criteria set for the risk 
assessment of biological agents supports the 
interdisciplinary work. Since only short 
phrases are used to describe the single criteria 
and measures, it is crucial that everybody 
filling in data into the system should use the 
same interpretation of the respective criteria.
H17 A structured representation and visualization 
of domain knowledge is essential for the 
communication of security information to 
stakeholders such as first responders and 
decision makers. The process of collaborative 
scenario building involving experts from 
different disciplines including scientists, 
police officers and veterinarians was found 
to be useful for identifying what kind of 
decisions are made by different actors and 
thus contribute to identify what kind of 
security information is adequate to provide 
to whom. 
 The work done in Task 1.1 is also relevant 
for the following actions of the EU CBRN 
Action Plan:
B9 The work on scenario analysis together with 
tasks 4.2 and 4.3 and the exercise with BSL-3 
laboratory staff (Appendix 7) has contributed 
to a better understanding of the role of  
simulants as positive controls in microbial 
forensic investigation including associated 
caveats. An important aspect is that the 
simulants may have different properties in 
comparison to the target organisms in certain 
aspects. For example Bacillus cereus appears 
to be more competitive than Bacillus anthracis 
in the broth used for pre-enrichment and 
controls performed with B. cereus as a 
simulant may overestimate the detection 
probability (Andersson, Unpublished results). 
The work on evaluation of evidence from 
microbiological analyses will also contribute 
to the establishment of criteria for validation 
of such methods.
H22 The generic scenario methodology used in 
the project was found to be useful also for 
scenarios in sampling and detection. The 
experience from the sampling and detection 
scenarios used in the table top exercise with 
laboratory staff and the scenario workshop 
at the WP5 meeting in December 2011 
(Appendix 11) showed that even a very simple 
scenario gave rise to interesting discussions 
where participants should discuss what 
statements could be made about the conta-
mination levels in a material from which 
samples are taken. The work on evaluation 
of evidence indicated that the Bayesian 
approach for evaluation of evidence is a 
useful approach for constructing scenarios 
in microbial forensics. Modelling tools for 
evaluating microbiological evidence have 
been developed within epidemiology (15), 
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forensic sciences (16) and risk assessment 
(17). However, most microbiologists seem to 
be aware of neither the statistical aspects of 
the result evaluation nor of the tools to deal 
with them. An important use of detection 
scenarios is to involve microbiologists in 
forensic exercises in order to raise their 
awareness of the interpretation problems 
and to initiate a discussion on how results 
from micro biological analyses should be 
presented to be useful in forensic and 
epidemiological investigations. 
Extra outcomes
The work on scenarios was the most efficient way 
to exchange knowledge between organizations 
and disciplines and served to strengthen the 
network of experts from safety, security and 
research. Although the workshops and exercises 
served well to disseminate knowledge and 
information to the participants the most important 
outcome was that the process of constructing the 
scenario as well as the interaction with the 
participants increased the cross disciplinary 
skills of the organizing team. Thus the joint 
construction of scenarios and exercises will not 
only be an important step towards useful and 
relevant definitions and explanations for terms 
but also contribute to an increased capability of 
handling bioterror incidents.
In retrospect the work on the database of terms 
and definitions may be seen as a pilot work that is 
useful for setting the specification for a full-scale 
database. It was noted that the understanding of 
a term depends largely on an understanding of 
its context, which may be a procedural manual or 
a legal document. Thus when constructing a term 
database for supporting communication in the 
CBRN field it is important that this information 
is included together with references to the source 
documents. In order for such a database to be 
maintained and updated it is essential to have  
a strategy for how the different organisations 
could be involved in keeping their own terms 
updated. This may for example be accomplished 
by creating a term-repository, analogous to 
Genebank where terms, and definitions could  
be deposited together with relevant metadata.   
FUTURE OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the work in this task we would like to 
propose some recommendations for future work 
within this area. References to relevant sections, 
publications or appendices are provided where 
applicable.
Recommendation in relation to terminology (13)
(Appendices 1-3)
• Focus on awareness of alternative definitions 
and ontologies rather than providing  
definitions for words from common language.
• Cross disciplinary communication should be 
part of the training of persons working in the 
interdisciplinary CBRN field including for 
example first responders, diagnostics personnel 
and decision makers.
• A searchable repository for terms and defi-
nition from competent bodies and authorities 
would be a valuable addition to existing term 
banks and glossaries.
• A domain based collection of text sources 
would support broader mechanistic text 
analytics.
Recommendation in relation to scenario work 
(Section “Extra Outcomes”)
• Scenarios for exercises and training should  
be constructed locally and the collective 
construction of scenarios should be appreciated 
as an important networking activity.
• An EU level scenario activity should focus  
on supporting local scenario construction. 
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Recommendation in relation to microbial forensics 
(5), (Section “Scenarios for forensics”, Appendices 8-10)
• Use the same generic concepts for routine 
source tracking and forensic investigations  
to maintain the competence and to promote 
cross-fertilization between methodology  
used in microbial forensic investigations and 
normal epidemiological investigations (5).  
• Involve scientists such as bioinformaticians, 
statisticians and epidemiologists in forensic-
exercises and scenario building (Appendix 8). 
• Highlight research and training needs. 
• Apply the forensic approach for evaluation  
of evidence to assess the value of planned 
reference data generation.
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Johan Olsson SMI 
 
Abstract (for newsletter) 
The AniBioThreat partners CVI, DTU, SJV, SLU and SVA participated in a terminology workshop 
in Uppsala, Sweden on the 14th of December, in association with the WP2 meeting. Claudia 
Dobrina and Henrik Nilsson from the Swedish centre for terminology (TNC) gave a 
presentation on the distinctions between words, terms and concepts and on the analysis of 
concept systems and how to write proper definitions. They also presented the results of their 
analysis of prioritized terms from AniBioThreat. During group discussion the workshop 
participants constructed concept systems for concepts connected to risk/threat/hazard, biorisk 
and biorisk management.  
Alternative solutions for managing a terms and definitions database were discussed. Henrik 
Nilsson (TNC) presented available software tool and requirements for data structure. 
Alternatives to storing the present collection of AniBioThreat definitions in an Excel sheet were 
discussed with staff from the IT-department of SVA.  
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Meeting report 
This report contains a short summary of the activities during the workshop. A more elaborate 
discussion on the topic which also considers results from discussions with other partners 
during the WP2 meeting and later reflections by the participants (edited by GA) is presented in 
appendix 1 “Discussion paper on terminology in AniBioThreat”. The meeting agenda is 
included as appendix 2. 
 
TNC presentations 
Claudia Dobrina presented the background to TNC and their work, the term bank and other 
assignments. 
She explained terminology and terminology work, the determinations and designations. 
Why – to ensure a clear communication between professionals and to deliver specialized 
knowledge in a concentrated form. 
She also explained the role of terminology and terminology science – and the definitions.  
 
The terminological tetrahedron includes term-concept-object and definition and showed some 
examples how formation of concepts is formed, difference between concept and objects. 
Objects have properties, concept has characteristics. Definition includes delimited 
characteristics. 
 
One important message is that all terms are words but not all words are terms.  A word 
becomes a term when: 
• it is widely used in a subject field  
•  the concept behind the term is clearly delimited  
 
A consequence of this is that not all words in the glossary may be terms and that is is neither 
possible nor necessary to define them. The words may still need an explanation or a 
note/comment. 
 
Then she told about how a terminology project should be carried out, different phases, and 
how she has planned and carried out her work. The priority list that has been taken out so far 
was up for discussion. She explained the generic concept relations in terminology work and in 
AniBioThreat. Finally definition of definitions, content and form requirements. 
 
Some discussion took place after the presentation, thereafter planning of the day, since the 
group was quite small, it was enough with one group. Before the work started Claudia showed 
diagrams she has prepared for some words on the priority list like biorisk management. 
 
Group discussions 
After coffee break discussion took place in one group about concepts and definitions related to 
threat/risk/hazard 
Task 1.1: Appendix 2
Task 1.1: Appendix 2
       Classification level: Open/Unclassified 
AniBioThreat. Bridging security, safety and research. www.anibiothreat.com 
 
 With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union 
 European Commission – Directorate – General Home Affairs 3 
(7) 
Hazard was found to be relatively easy to define, for example as “an accidental or naturally 
occurring phenomenon with the potential to cause physical or psychological harm to humans 
including loss of life, damage or losses of property, and/or disruption to the environment or to 
structures (economic social, political) upon which a community's way of life depends”(annex 2). 
Alternative phrasings were discussed, most of which were considered acceptable. The 
definitions were generally not “operational”, that is hazard was not defined by how it is 
measured.  
 
A long discussion took place regarding the definition of threat. Different views were expressed 
ranging from the view that threat refers to a “threat statement” and the view that threat , 
from the AniBioThreat perspective should refer to real threats. The discussion was not settled 
during the workshop….  
An attempt to structure the idea, after the workshop is presented in appendix 1. 
 
Alternative definitions of risk were discussed including both qualitative ones (risk defined as a 
phenomina) or operational definitions (How risk is calculated). Rickard Knutsson showed 
examples of alternative operational definitions from different countries (e.g. risk = probability 
* severity; risk= probability*severity*vulnerability). Also alternative definitions of threat were 
presented. 
 
After lunch the discussion continued in in two groups. 
We discussed different terms, risk, threat hazard, differences between them and whether  
some words should be excluded from a definitions list. Different approach were followed in 
the twogroups. 
 
It was discussed whether the operational” definition (probability * consequence) would be 
reasonal for the concept biorisk since the term biorisk is primarily used to discuss risks in a 
qualitative manner as in “identify the Biorisk(s)” or control the Biorisk. It was suggested that in 
contexts where the term biorisk is used for “biological risks” the simple term risk would be 
used in any situation where the “operational” definitions makes sense. However, the two 
groups presented different views and the issue was not solved. ….  
An attempt to structure the idea, after the workshop is presented in appendix 1. 
 
During the workshop terms and concepts related to (bio)risk management were discussed in 
the context of the Biorisk Management Standard. It was discussed whether it made sense to 
use the concept biorisk in the discussion since biorisk is not well defined. An alternative 
definition of “biorisk management” was proposed using only the concepts risk and biohazard. 
However, not all participants agreed with this definition. It was also pointed out that the 
definition if risk management from the biorisk standard is much wider than de definition used 
by codex and OIE.  
An attempt to structure the idea, after the workshop is presented in appendix 1. 
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Planning of further work 
Gunnar will work further with the definition list. He will modify, make some changes and send 
them for review 
 
Concrete, structure, important to create a way to work.  It was suggested that WP leader 
should send their lists to Gunnar. Gunnar pointed out that there are already workinggroups 
defined in the task 1.1 DOW responsible for certain sets of terms. A summary of these groups 
and their relation to tasks and WP’s is shown in figure 5. These groups does not exactly follow 
the WP structures reflecting the fact that some tasks from different WP5 may share important 
terminolgy (e.g. task 4.1 and 2.1) Gunnar proposed to activate these groups instead of creating 
a new system. 
 
Under all circumstances it is important that the WP and task leaders are committed to support 
the work and dedicate time. It is also important to agree on level of ambition and aims. It may 
be necessary to bring the question to the Steering committee. In any case we must take a 
decision soon recognizing that there is a pressure from other partners, especially BfR, to see 
results and get feedback on the work invested. 
 
As pointed out by Oskar, active leadership in WP5 is needed. Gunnar will activate the working 
group or each task leader and try to manage the work. The workshop at the WP5 meeting in 
Paris was a kickoff for this. We need to be able to identify, technical terms within labwork is 
very varying. 
 
For the other workinggroups it is essential that the someone takes the lead to make sure that 
goals are set and time is allocated. 
 
Some suggestions and recommendations from TNC – don’t do double work, much is already 
done, look at the termbank first, thereafter work on definitions. Exemple: energy, bluelight, 
etc, within the same field of work. Cooperation is important! Networkning is important!  
 
It may be useful to try to bring up work on terms and definitions to SOFÄ  
(Swedish CBRNE network – what is the correct translation??) 
 
Vocabulary management issues 
Henrik Nilson (TNC) gave a presentation of a possible management of a termbank, TMG – 
terminology maintenance group. 
 
In any case a system is needed, so that the lists are correctly delivered. A problem with the 
current excel file is that it is sometimes filled in wrongly which creates disorder. Another 
problem is that the many columns are difficult to read on the screen and that text for 
definitions is hard to read in small boxes. 
Gunnar will discuss the solution with Henrik B and Erik H and try to cone up with a a system. 
Temporary solutions that can be demonstrated while we wait for final solution. Several 
Task 1.1: Appendix 2
Task 1.1: Appendix 2
       Classification level: Open/Unclassified 
AniBioThreat. Bridging security, safety and research. www.anibiothreat.com 
 
 With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union 
 European Commission – Directorate – General Home Affairs 5 
(7) 
commercial software for management of terminology project excists. The alternative would be 
to build a SQL database or similar. The important thing is to have the correct datastructure. 
 
It was proposed to make a difference between generic and wp-specific terms, those in 
common and those that differ and to build the terms WP-wise, and connect thereafter. Divide 
an extra column for WPs, to be able to organize, to WP or tasks 
 
(This may be applied to workinggroups instead, G’s comment). 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of workinggroups for terms and definitions, and responsible person 
according to DOW. 
 
 
 
 
  
WG  decision making, communication and law 
enforcement. Elisabeth Sjöberg (SVA) 
WG decision…
WG  labdata. Gunnar Andersson (SVA)
WG labdata
WG Biorisk 
management
Bo Sundqvist 
(SVA)
WG databases
Erik Heed (SVA)
WG forensics Birgitta Rasmussen (SKL)
WG  Chains (vacant)
WG chains
WG Biorisk 
management
WG scenario framework (Andersson (SVA)
WG scenario 
framework
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Appendix 2: Agenda 
 
Time Activity Speakers Topic 
8:30 
 
 
8:30-9:30 
 
 
 
9:30-
10:00 
 
Opening of the 
meeting 
 
Terminology work – 
why, what and how 
 
 
Planning session 
Organizers 
 
 
Claudia Dobrina 
& Henrik 
Nilsson, TNC 
 
Claudia Dobrina 
TNC  
 
Project leader  
 
 
 
 
Introduction into terminology work: 
- terms, concepts, definitions 
- steps of a terminology project 
 
Presentation of AniBioThreat 
Vocabulary and diagrams 
 
Selection of concept clusters for 
further discussion and division into 
groups, e.g. 1) threat and risk 
mangagement, 2) biopreparedness 
and bioterrorism 
10:00-
10:20 Coffee Break 
  
10:20-
11:45 
Group discussions   
11:45-
12:15 
 
12:15-13 
Report of the 
groups 
 
Planning of further 
work 
  
 
 
How should we proceed? 
How should we manage the definitions 
list on the IWA. 
Need for position paper on Animal 
Bioterrorism including terms/definitions 
(and translation between 
languages/disciplines) 
 
13:00- 
13:45 Lunch   
13:45-
14:45 
Vocabulary 
management issues 
Henrik Nilsson 
/Gunnar 
Andersson 
Addition of new entries, updating, 
presentation (database solution/TMS, 
etc.) 
14:45-
15:30 
Summary of results Project leader  
 
Collecting and sorting notes 
Edit files 
Prepare report from the day 
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The scope and results of the investigation ............................................................................................1 
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Annexes (under separate cover)……………………………………………………………………… 
Annex 1 Concept diagrams 
Annex 2 List of concepts 
Annex 3 Relevant contexts 
Annex 4 Priority list 
 
Background 
According to SVA’s document of 2011-09-19 TNC has received the following assignment from SVA: 
- Titta på bruttolistan och bygga upp begrepps hierarkier för valda delar. Prioritering på termer 
 och begrepp från Call-text i kommissionens papper (se bilaga) och viktiga ord och begrepp  
 från projektets- och olika WPns titlar  
- Beskriva begreppshierarkin i användbart format 
- Förslag på hur termer och begrepp kan integreras med andra termer och definitioner projekt 
  (CBRN) (skall finnas med i rapporten) 
- Rekommendationer hur arbetet kan gå vidare och var det saknas användbara termer och  
 definitioner (skall finnas med i rapporten) 
- Rekommendationer hur AniBioThreat – CBRN – Rikstermbanken kan vara kompatibla  
 (skall finnas med i rapporten) 
- Hur hanterar databasmässigt termer där en översatt term står för delvis annat begrepp (t ex 
 vidare, smalare)…. 
- Rekommendationer om hur jobba vidare med förvaltningen (skall finnas med i rapporten. 
- Svenska termer, svenska definitioner ur befintliga källor läggs in. 
- Eventuella kommentarer på de engelska definitionerna tillförs.) 
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The scope and results of the investigation 
According to the objectives specified in the SVA’s assignment of 2011-09-19 TNC has carried out 
a preliminary terminological analysis of central concepts for the AniBioThreat project1. The 
analysis is labeled preliminary because a proper terminological analysis requires that all major 
decisions concerning analysis and presentation of terminological information should be taken in 
cooperation between subject field experts and terminologists (which is in accordance with the 
methodology of terminology work described in international standards2). A joint effort of the 
project team and terminologists is thus required to finalize TNC’s proposal.  
The analysis carried out by TNC included the following steps: 
1. Collection of relevant documentation: document texts, vocabularies, etc. 
2. Extraction of terminological support information from the collected material including:  
- contexts (mostly English), i.e. text excerpts which illustrate the usage of terms in the Priority 
list (Annex 4) in the respective domains, 
- concept descriptions (English and Swedish) , namely definitions, explanations, 
supplementary information (encyclopedic, etc.) as the basis for identification and 
delimitation of the concepts to be analyzed, 
- information for selection of relevant Swedish equivalents of the original English terms. 
3. Elaboration of concept systems and preparation (selection, adjustment and in some cases 
formulation) of definitions to achieve a better compliance between the drafted concept 
systems and the definitions. 
4. Identification of preferred terms (terms which are to be used in the first place for a certain 
concept) and admitted terms (terms which refer to the same concept as preferred terms but for 
various reasons considered not quite appropriate, in other words, synonyms). 
5. Presentation of the results of the analysis in an appropriate form.  
 
Comments on steps 1-5 
1. The sources included the material supplied by SVA as well as the documents found through 
extensive Google searches.  
2. Different documents were used as sources of different types of support information:  
 CBRN Action Plan and Bridging Security and Safety Research (AniBioThreat Kick 
Off Meeting Report), Green Paper and Laboratory Biosafety Guidance were used for 
forming an idea of the current term usage in the project domain. A selection of 
contexts collected is presented in Annex 3 Relevant contexts. 
 CBRN Glossary, CWA 15793, ISO guides and ISO and CEN standards, WHO, 
Interpol and other international organization documents, special and general language 
                                                     
1 The list of concepts to be analyzed is given in Annex 4 Priority list 
2 For example, ISO 704:2009 Terminology work – principles and methods, ISO 15188:2001 Project 
management guidelines for terminology standardization 
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dictionaries as well as a vast number of web sources were used for extraction of 
relevant concept descriptions.  
 CBRN glossary.sv and a number of web sources were used for identifying credible 
Swedish equivalents.  
3. A concept analysis of the collected concept descriptions has been carried out in order to 
identify relations between the concepts analyzed and to elaborate concept systems. It showed 
that many of the concepts in the Priority list are defined in a different manner in different 
authoritative sources. This may be due to a number of reasons, e.g. that the domain is not 
homogeneous and that it includes a number of subdomains where the same term may denote 
either quite different concepts or slightly differing concepts or that the definitions in question 
were formulated for different user groups. As an example the definitions of the concept threat 
can be considered. One of the definitions comes from a general language dictionary and 
reflects a very general view of the concept; another found in a relevant document (“likelihood 
for an adverse event to occur, as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, disruption or 
damage”) contains important characteristics “likelihood”, “intention” (these help to see the 
differences between the concepts threat and risk) and “damage”; a third definition 
(“substance, condition or event, which by its presence has the potential to rapidly harm an 
exposed population, sufficiently lead to a major crisis”) belongs to the domain of public health 
and describes a concept which differs radically from the other too. The 2nd definition was 
chosen as most representative and was included in the concept system (see Annex 1 Concept 
diagrams). All other cases of multiple definitions were treated likewise.  
The analysis of the concepts in the Priority list showed that they can be viewed as belonging 
to several concept clusters, i.e. thematically related groups of concepts. The following concept 
clusters were identified:  
 Threat/risk/hazard  
 Bioterrorism and biopreparedness  
 Biorisk management 
 Transaction analysis  
 Forensics. 
The first three clusters have been presented in the form of concept diagrams reflecting the 
underlying concept systems. There is also a concept diagram with all three clusters presented 
together. Transaction analysis and forensics include too few concepts for a concept diagram to be 
reasonable. The concept diagrams include all three types of concept relations traditionally used in 
terminology work:  
 generic relations (X is a type of Y), e.g. biohazard is a type of hazard,  
 partitive relations (X constitutes part of Y), e.g. risk identification and risk communication 
are viewed as parts of risk management  
 associative relations (X has something to do with Y), e.g. early warning has to do with 
prevention. The exact content of the relation (which can be rather difficult to verbalize) is 
not shown in the diagrams but can usually be seen in the definitions of the respective 
concepts.  
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In terminological practice the elaboration of concept systems usually goes hand in hand with 
definition work: collected concept descriptions are analyzed and concept systems are drafted and 
checked against the definitions. In this project, however, there was no question of formulating new 
definitions, that is why this practice has not been followed and as a result there might be a certain 
discrepancy between the definition of the concept and its place in the concept hierarchy, e.g. 
biorisk which is a type of risk is not defined as “risk which…”. 
4. The most difficult problem TNC met with when elaborating concept systems for 
AniBioThreat concepts was to distinguish between the concepts risk, threat and hazard. They 
may have dissimilar definitions but they are often used interchangeably in a number of 
authoritative documents. The situation becomes even more complicated when these terms are 
part of multiword terms, e.g. risk assessment, threat assessment. We have therefore chosen to 
present them in the following manner: 
As risk and threat are often used together, e.g. “awareness of CBRN risks and threats” “risk 
and threat assessments” [EU CBRN Action plan] the concepts of risk management, risk 
assessment, etc. can be regarded as dealing with both threats and risks. The definitions of risk 
management and several other related concepts have been modified to include threat: 
“systematic approach to identifying, addressing and reducing risks and threats of all kinds 
associated with hazards and human activities” (risk management). Consequently, the concept 
biorisk management which is a type of risk management can be regarded as including such 
parts as risk assessment, risk evaluation, etc. See the concept diagram, Biorisk management in 
Annex 1. Threat terms, such as threat assessment and threat communication are listed as 
synonyms for risk assessment, risk communication, etc.in List of concepts (Annex 2). This is 
of course to be regarded as just a suggestion on TNC’s part which is intended to be used as the 
basis for discussion at the coming project team meeting. 
5. The results of the investigation are presented in the following way: 
 Concept systems for a number of the most central concepts in the Priority list 
(mainly from the domains of WP 2-4) are presented in the form of terminological 
concept diagrams. (Annex 1 Concept diagrams). 
 The term and concept information concerning the concepts in the Priority list is 
presented in a terminological vocabulary to be found in the Excel file List of 
concepts (Annex 2). List of concepts includes three tabs: 
1. Definitions list which contains the original material from SVA. 
2. TNC which is a kind of a terminological vocabulary containing terminological 
entries (collection of information on a specific concept) for the concepts 
included in the Priority list. The entries contain information on English and 
Swedish terms and synonyms, English and Swedish definitions and notes, 
English and Swedish contexts, sources of terms, definitions, notes and 
contexts and TNC’s comment (not all entries contain all types of 
information). The definitions extracted from various documents have been left 
as they were or somewhat modified according to the established 
terminological practice, e.g. biorisk management. Some of the definitions 
have been formulated by TNC. If several definitions have been collected they 
are listed in separate rows numbered 1 to 4). Some of multiple definitions 
refer to the same concept, e.g. bioterrorism 1 and 2, while others describe 
differing concepts, e.g. threat 1 and 2.  
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3. Sources which lists the occurrence of priority list concepts in several central 
documents (to be considered as working material) 
 The support material which illustrates the term usage in authoritative documents 
is presented in Annex 3 Relevant contexts. 
 The final Priority list is in Annex 4. 
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Annex 1 Concept diagrams
generic relation, e.g. biorisk is a type of risk
partitive relation, e.g. risk identification, risk analysis 
and risk evaluation are parts of risk assessment)
associative relation, e.g. risk management has to do 
with risk. The content of the relation is usually revealed in 
the respective definitions. It can also be specified directly 
in the diagram, e.g. hazard may lead to consequence.
Arrows are usually directed from that concept in the 
definition of which the other concept is used or could be 
assumed to be used (the definition of threat includes 
likelihood) 
Notation used:
Concepts not in bold style are not listed in List of concepts.
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threat risk
biorisk 
animal 
bioterrorism 
threat
CBRN threat
AniBioThreat (an overview)
biosafety biosecurity
detection response
biopreparedness
biorisk 
management 
preventionawareness
risk management
risk 
communication
…
risk assessment
risk 
analysis
risk preparedness/
response
risk 
identi-
fication 
risk 
evaluation 
hazard biohazard
bioterrorism
animal bio-
terrorism
terrorism
vulnerability
first 
responder
scenario-based 
modelling
consequence
may lead to
scenario surveillanceearly 
warning
likelihood
agro-
terrorism
intention
civil protection
sampling
vaccine 
preparedness
diagnosis
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threat
likelihood for an adverse 
event to occur, as an 
expression of intention to 
inflict evil, injury, disruption 
or damage
risk
probable rate of 
occurrence of a hazard 
causing harm…
Threat/risk/hazard
hazard
An accidental or naturally 
occurring phenomenon 
with the potential to cause 
physical or psychological 
harm…
biohazard
potential source 
of harm caused 
by biological 
agents or toxins
vulnerability
degree to which a 
community is suscep-
tible to hazards 
consequence
outcome of an 
event affecting 
objectives
likelihood
quantitative or 
qualitative expression 
of the chances that an 
event will occur
biorisk
combination of the probability of 
occurrence of harm and the severity of that 
harm where the source of harm is a 
biological agent or toxin
may lead to
intention
resolve or 
design…
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Bioterrorism and biopreparedness
animal bioterrorism threat threats to 
living animals, animal feed and food of 
animal origin 
CBRN threat
detection
act of locating 
CBRN 
hazards…
response
actions taken before, 
during and immediately 
after the occurrence of a 
disaster…
biopreparedness
…activities relating 
to the protection of 
public health
prevention
activities to provide 
outright avoidance 
of the adverse 
impact of hazards…
awareness (of 
CBRN risks and 
threats)
bioterrorism
intentional release of 
biological agents or toxins…
animal bioterrorism 
bioterrorism directed 
against living animals, 
animal feed and food 
of animal origin
first responder
emergency 
service 
personnel …
scenario-based 
modelling
scenario
…sequence of events 
based on certain 
assumptions… 
surveillance
collection, collation and 
analysis of data for 
public health purposes
early warning
advance warning of 
natural/technological 
hazards occurrence
civil protection
systematic actions of planning, 
training, preparedness…
threat
likelihood for an adverse event to 
occur, as an expression of intention 
to inflict evil, injury, disruption or 
damage
terrorism
agroterrorism
deliberate malicious 
introduction of an animal 
or plant disease …
intention
resolve or 
design…
sampling
act, process, 
or technique 
of selecting a 
suitable 
sample…
vaccine 
preparedness
diagnosis
act or process of identifying or 
determining the nature and 
cause of a disease or injury…
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risk
probable rate of occurrence of a 
hazard causing harm…
Biorisk management
biosafety
containment principles, 
technologies and 
practices that are 
implemented to prevent 
the unintentional 
exposure to pathogens 
and toxins, or their 
accidental release
biosecurity
access control, security 
procedures) to reduce the risk of 
transmission of infectious diseases 
and invasive alien species and to 
prevent the malicious use of 
dangerous pathogens…
biorisk management
controlling risks associated 
with the handling or storage 
and disposal of biological 
agents and toxins
risk management
systematic approach 
to identifying, 
addressing and 
reducing risks and 
threats…
risk communication
interactive exchange of 
information and opinions 
throughout the risk 
management process …
risk assessment
overall process of 
risk/threat 
identification, 
risk/threat analysis  
and risk/threat 
evaluation
risk analysis
process to 
comprehend the 
nature of risk/threat 
and to determine 
the level of 
risk/threat 
risk 
preparedness/response
risk identification
process of finding, 
recognizing and 
describing risks 
and threats
risk evaluation
process of 
comparing the 
results of risk 
analysis with risk 
criteria)…
biorisk
combination of the 
probability of occurrence of 
harm and the severity of 
that harm where the source 
of harm is a biological agent 
or toxin
risk
probable rate of occurrence of a 
hazard causing har
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    Annex 4 
Priority list 
1. Agroterrorism 
2. Animal bioterrorism 
3. Animal bioterrorism threat 
4. Awareness 
5. Biohazard 
6. Biopreparedness 
7. Biorisk  
8. Biorisk management 
9. Biosafety 
10. Biosecurity 
11. Bioterrorism 
12. Consequence 
13. Contingency 
14. Detection 
15. Detection field 
16. Diagnosis 
17. Diagnostics 
18. Dissemination 
19. Early warning 
20. First responder 
21. Forensic analysis 
22. Forensic Response Plan 
23. Forensic sampling 
24. Hazard 
25. Impact 
26. Incident communication 
27. Intention 
28. Likelihood 
29. Prevention 
30. Response 
31. Risk 
Delivery report from TNC, 2011-12-05, including Annex 1 & 4. 
 
 
32. Risk analysis 
33. Risk assessment 
34. Risk communication 
35. Risk identification 
36. Risk management 
37. Sampling 
38. Scenario 
39. Surveillance 
40. Suspicious transactions 
41. Threat 
42. Threat assessment 
43. Threat communication 
44. Threat identification 
45. Threat recognition 
46. Transaction analysis 
47. Vaccine preparedness 
48. Vulnerability 
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Conceptual framework for scenario building (1.4) 
Background 
« Scenarios are an important tool for the project. They are needed for the planning of 
exercises, developing and challenging response plans, assessing vulnerabilities and 
setting work priorities. The construction of useful scenarios requires collaboration 
between experts in various disciplines. » (Task 1.1 DOW.) 
 
Several activities in AbiBioThreat are connected to recommendations connected to 
scenarios. During the start-up phase it has been obvious that experience in working 
with scenarios differs in both in extent and context. As a consequence there have been 
different ideas about what a scenario is which has clearly impaired communication and 
also made it difficult to agree on directions and goals. The work so far has identified 
various needs for different tasks and cannot be described in one format.  
 
Constructing a realistic and relevant « background story » takes a lot of research and 
must involve experts is several disciplines. It would be time saving if the same 
« background story » could be used to construct several user scenarios for different 
purposes. When constructing a scenario for a specific purpose the goals and 
objectives of the specific task should come first, and the choice of « background story » 
should come later. The work in task 1.1 at present aims at specifying the needs of the 
scenarios in the different tasks and based on this see if one or several of the existing 
« background stories » are fit for the purpose 
 
Scenario template for WP1 meeting. 
Before the WP1 meeting in Rome, Jan 2011 a template for describing a scenario was sent out 
to the participants. This template can be used to describe in a structured way be basic 
information about as scenario as well as an outline of the series of events.  
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The « headings » for the template are largely taken from exercise scenarios but supplemented 
with specific « headings » needed for a describing a scenario involving intentional release of  b-
agents targeting animals. 
A handful of scenarios have been sketched in this template (Appendix tableApp1). The template 
proved useful to capture basic information whereas the format for describing the series of 
events was seen as too limiting. What is also missing in this template is a good format for 
describing the intended use. 
An example of a scenario (Anthrax in feed, covert) is presented in appendix 1, 
 
Scenario wish list. 
In order to structure the work a « wish list » was sent out before the general meeting in April 
2011 where each partner was asked to specify their needs for scenarios in the different tasks in 
AniBioThreat. The results are summarized in Appendix table App2. 
 
Scenario workshop SVA May 23 2011 
On May 23 a scenario workshop was held at SVA with the aim of generating a list of 
« user scenarios » that should be constructed in AniBioThreat, (Spec tasks 4.1 and 3.2 
and 3.2) and specify the use of and requirements on these scenarios. 
A second aim was to identify needs for education, tools and expert support. 
A preliminary list of information that should be specified for each « user scenario » is given in 
Table 1. One example was given by Gunnar specifying the need for a scenario for « working 
group detection » dealing with the design of sampling plans for hazardous microorganisms. 
In the workshop two additional scenarios were specified. One scenario « contingency plan »  
with the aim of testing the functionality of a contingency plan immediately after detect of an 
epizootic agent and the second scenario « communication » aiming at testing the 
communication plan. 
It was agreed that both scenario could well fit to the core scenario « anthrax in feed –covert ».   
 
Both scenarios would also focus on approximately the same « time window » but involve 
different actors. A user scenario » communication » should also be coupled to a core scenario 
involving theft of biological agents thus generating two user scenarios. As an example the 
specifications for user scenario « Contingency plan » are given in table 2. 
 
Table 1 : Information that should be specified for each user scenario 
Usage The intended use of the scenario, e.g. exercise, modelling, scenario 
analysis. 
 
Capability  tested The capabilities that the scenario tests 
Threat /challenge . 
  
The threat that the scenario deals with. Agent-antagonist /the 
immediate threat/challenge to the society or organisation. (e.g. work 
overload) 
Actors 
 
In this case the persons and agencies etc that are players in the 
scenario. 
 
Tools/resources The tools and resources available to the players. 
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« Core scenario » The core scenario that the user scenario should be connected to. 
Timeframe/delimitatio
ns 
The timeframe that the « user scenario » deals with as well as 
delimitations in time, space as well as in the aspects considered. 
Table 2: User Scenario”Contingency plan” 
 
Title  ”Contingency plan” 
 
Part “usage and goals” 
 
Purpose: 
– Evaluating functionality of SVAs general contingency plan.  
Actors:  
– SVAs board, and units   *  *trained  
– SVA Biosafety committee   * 
SVA safety committee  * 
– SLU 
– Health care (disease control) 
– Board of agriculture  
– Regional agencies    
Threat/challenge:  
– Agent as in core scenario (Anthrax) 
– The organization may not handle the task/mission in a situation with criminal 
release of zoonotic agent. 
Capacities/capabilities challenged:  
– Situation awareness    
–  Detection and alarm    
– Communication and cooperation  
– Decide and lead    
– Rescue and protect    
– Documentation     
Tools:  
– Contingency plan    
– Contingency organization 
– (Participants, figurants ”co-players”) 
– Checklists 
– Internal experts 
– External experts/Networks  
–  
Part « sub scenario » 
 
Core scenario 
– Anthrax i feed – covert (Kickoff scenario) 
Time frame:  
– Act 1:  
– T0 = Outbreak detected at pathology department  
– T1 = Situation is managed, ”case opened, Code yellow”   
– Act 2:  
– T0=Report about incident presented to decision maker 
T1= Case closed 
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A conceptual framework for scenario work. 
Based on the discussion on terminology that resulted from our attempts to specify our scenario 
needs we have attempted to sort out the terminology related to scenario construction. 
 
Or first concept is the « core scenario » (in Swedish “ramscenario” = “frame scenario”). The 
question was raised whether there is a difference between « core-« and « frame-« scenarios. 
For the time being they are considered equivalent. However, one may argue that there is a 
subtle difference, e.g. with respect to delimitations in time and space or with respect to 
alternative series of events.  
 
The most important purpose of the core scenario is to provide realism and relevance. 
Experience from exercises has shown that unrealistic or irrelevant scenarios will annoy the 
participants so that they lose motivation. The similar would be expected to happen if an 
unrealistic or irrelevant scenario is used as example in a survey or a workshop. For theoretical 
modelling the realism may be less important in the first place but it would still be needed in 
order to convince stakeholders about the usefulness of models. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. The core scenario (Sv « Ramscenario » = « frame scenario » ) consists of a 
set of preconditions including basic facts of the agents (epidemiological etc, the actor 
(=perpetrator) the target, season, involved agencies etc). The core scenario also 
consists of a description of the events taking place (possible alternative series). The 
events take place at several levels. There will (usually) be a spatiotemporal spread of 
the agent but in addition there may be an epidemiological investigation, a police 
investigation, crisis management etc going on 
 
Time
Space
Preconditions Series of events…
A
sp
ec
ts
..
T=0
Spred of agens
Epidemiological investigation
Crisis management & communication
Biorisk management/protection
Police investigation/forensic
Prep Start Alarm Reaction Response Recovery
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According to our suggested definition the core scenario consists of a set of preconditions 
(epidemiological potential of agent etc) that sets the « rules » for the development of the 
scenario. In addition the core scenario contains a description of the series of events taking 
place. The series of events take place at many levels where the spread of the agent is one and 
the epidemiological investigation is another. (Figure 1) Of course, not all these levels can be 
described in detail and thus the core scenario will be described at a « low resolution ». 
 
The levels that are described/modelled depend on the intended use of the scenario. However, 
since a main purpose with the core scenario is to provide realism a « level » should not be 
omitted too casually. For example, the spread of the disease is not independent of the 
epidemiological investigation and resulting interventions. Thus the ability to detect the spread, 
the response time and the power of interventions must be taken into considerations, for the 
sake of realism.  
Likewise, if a crime is suspected or confirmed the police investigations may provide clues to the 
epidemiological investigation. 
 
Sub- and User- scenarios 
The scenarios that are actually needed in the project are what we at present call « user 
scenarios ». The scenario may be needed for exercise, scenario analysis or modelling or simply 
for illustration or raising awareness. 
 
The key feature of the user scenario is that it comes with an aim and a goal. (Figure 2) The aim 
is typically to train or study one or several capabilities. When constructing a user scenario the 
core scenario or agenise is subordinate to the aim/purpose. However, since, in most cases, the 
user scenario needs realism and relevance the « core scenario » must still be kept in mind 
though not necessarily documents and in many cases a scenario constructer with experience in 
the subject could do this intuitively. However, the problem arises when the subject is complex 
and no single expert holds the knowledge to construct a scenario which is relevant realistic, 
challenges the right capabilities and involves the right actors. In this case even the construction 
of a very simple user scenario may still demand a great deal of background research to provide 
the realism. 
 
In addition, several activities should be based on risk rated scenarios something which calls for 
even more background research and in practice may mean that the core scenarios must be 
more formally described. 
 
Thus the philosophy of AniBioThreat task 1.1 is that we use joint effort to construct a small set 
of core scenarios that are as different as possible not only with respect to agent but also with 
respect to capabilities challenged and actors involved. The idea is that a few core scenarios 
should meet the demands of all user scenarios needed in AniBioThreat.  
 
By re-using a limited number of core scenarios for several purposes we can ensure that the 
user scenarios are based realistic and risk rated core scenarios. 
 
When the goal of the user scenario has been specified it can be connected to a core scenario. 
For practically any purpose (except possible a huge exercise) the user scenario will be based 
on a sub-scenario from the core scenario. In many situations this kind of sub-scenarios from a 
(often implicit) core-scenario is referred to as “the scenario”. As shown in fig 2, the sub-scenario 
that forms the basis of the user scenario is delimited not only in time and space but also in the 
aspects covered.  It may deal for example only with the decision making at agency x at a 
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particular window in time.  Since the sub-scenario is the part of the scenario that will be used 
the series of event will be described in more detail than for the core scenario. 
 
If the user scenario is an “exercise scenario” it also may contain detailed descriptions of 
situation that a parson faces and should react upon. These “snapshots” are referred to as 
viginettes. (Figure 2). Such “viginettes” may also serve a purpose in other scenarios for other 
purposes, e.g. illustration or awareness rising.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relation between core scenario, (sub-) scenarios and “user scenarios”. A 
main feature of the “user scenario” is that it has an intended use and an aim/goal, e.g. 
a tabletop exercise with the aim of improving decision making and communication. 
 
 
Scenario descriptors. 
One goal in AniBioThreat is to create a database of scenarios. During the first months of the 
projects there has been confusion about the usage as well as the content and structure of such 
a database. If a scenario database should be more than a collection of text files a uniform 
format for describing scenarios is needed. 
A unified format for describing a scenario is also a useful tool for constructing scenarios, in 
particular when scenario construction is a “joint exercise”. In addition a unified format is useful 
for sharing and re-using scenarios.  
 
Based on the discussion we propose that a modular approach could be used to describe 
scenarios. In figure three we propose a structure where the description of scenarios is 
subdivided in “modules” that can be represented as objects of the class “core scenario”, class 
“sub scenario” or class “user scenario” (Figure 3).   
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The different “modules” or what we choose to call them would hold different kind of information. 
An example of what information that would be stored for a “core scenario” a “sub-scenario” or a 
“user scenario” is given in figure 4.  In this document we have named the descriptors “attributes” 
( in Swedish “egenskaper”). In figure 4 attributes have been grouped under larger headings e.g. 
“Agent” “Target area”, “Capabilities”, “delimitations” etc.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proposed structure for a database of scenarios. 
 
Sometimes we used the term “modules” when referring to such groups of attributes. The green 
and yellow boxes in figure 4 (Preconditions + series of events) corresponds to the 
information provided in the scenario template used for the WP1 meeting in Rome Jan 
2011. As example of this, the scenario “anthrax in feed- covert” from the kickoff-
meeting is described in this template (Appendix 1) 
 
The sub scenario and user scenario descriptors would correspond to the information 
given in “user scenario contingency plan” in this document. However, in addition to the 
general descriptors other information may need to be included in the sub-scenario. 
 
Core scenario 1.
Core scenario 2
Core scenario 3.
Preconditions scenario 1.
Events scenario 1. alt 1
Events scenario 1. alt 2
(sub-)scenario 1.1.
Delimitations scenario 1.1
Details scenario 1.1
(sub-)scenario 1.2
Delimitations scenario 1.2
Details scenario 1.2
User scenario 1.1.1.
Goals: scenario 1.1.1
Usage/class.
”cure/sub scenario)
Descriptors scenario 1.1.1
(Viginettes etc)
(sub-)scenario 1.3.
Delimitations scenario 1.1
Details scenario 1.1
User scenario 1.1.1.
Goals: scenario 1.1.1
Usage class
”cure/sub scenario)
Descriptors scenario 1.1.1
(Viginettes etc)
Core scenarios Subscenarios User scenarios
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Figure 4. Descriptors of the scenario. 
Strategic vs. Tactical scenarios 
 
The scenario templates sketched above only considers scenarios which are built 
around one “incident” which may be a release of an agent or a suspicion that it 
happened. Although the timeline of the scenario may start before the “incident” the 
“reference time point” (t0) is still the “Incident”. 
 
Although a common view, many scenarios relevant for AniBioThreat does not fit into 
this template. One example is a scenario where an “attacker” is planning an attack and 
the “defences” tries to prevent it. In this case neither time of attack nor agent may be 
fixed and there may not be an incident at all… 
 
For the time being we refer to the scenarios built around an incident as “tactical 
scenarios” whereas the broader scenarios (e.g.  Involving multiple possible attacks) 
may be referred to as “strategic scenarios”. (Fig. 5).  The strategic scenarios would 
define the higher strategic goal of the “attacker” (destroy economy) as well as 
boundary conditions. Depending on the strategic decisions made by the attacker 
(allocation of resources, choice of target and weapon etc) we would end up in different 
“tactical scenarios” with different preconditions. These “tactical preconditions will 
determine the (set of alternative) series of events and the consequences (optionally a 
set of alternative consequences with probabilities). In a strategic scenario the 
description of the series of events for each alternative tactical scenario will be of very 
“low resolution” or maybe even replaced by a threat assessment… 
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Fig.5. Relation between strategic and tactical scenarios 
 
 
 
As an example of strategic scenario fig 5 shows an “attacker defender scenario”. 
However. It should be recognized that a strategic scenario is not necessarily an 
“attacker defender scenario”. Rather a scenario that describes moves by attacker and 
defender may be considered a special case of a strategic scenario and the event tree 
shown in fig 1 may be an “attribute” of some strategic scenarios but not all. 
 
 
User scenarios can of course be based on a (sub scenario of) a strategic scenario. An 
exercise in e.g. decision making does not necessarily have to be based on a scenario 
where “weapon” and “target” is already fixed. A “strategic” decision making scenario for 
e.g. a tabletop exercise could start with the information  there is a suspected increase 
threat level (“attacker suspected to have made move x”) and the “defender” should 
decide on a countermove (e.g. ban all work with select agent, build a 15ft concrete wall 
round SVA, install video monitoring at farms etc…) 
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Fig 6. User scenarios from a strategic scenario. The colored layers represent different 
aspects of the strategic scenario, in this case actions taken by the attacker and 
defender. (The event tree showed combined output of the layers “attacker actions” and 
“defender actions”.) Other strategic scenarios may deal with other aspects… 
 
 
 
Sub- and user scenarios (e.g. exercise scenarios) can be based on either a “strategic” 
or a “tactical” scenario (or maybe both?). A tactical scenario can be connected to a 
strategic scenario if relevant. (E.g. one may separate preconditions in “strategic” and 
“tactical”. For most “tactical” exercise scenarios the “strategic information” would 
probably be there only to add realism.  A strategic scenario may or may not be 
connected with a set of alternative “tactical scenarios” that would represent alternative 
outcomes of for example an “attacker defender game”. It may also be relevant to 
include clusters of tactical scenarios or “generalized tactical scenarios” for examples 
tactical scenarios for examples scenarios where the agent share some key properties 
(e.g. virulence properties or epidemiological properties). 
 
A scenario database (or “scenario repository”) hosting also strategic scenarios is 
sketched in figure 7.  In this view strategic and tactical scenarios are two classes of 
scenarios. A strategic scenario may be connected to a set of tactical scenarios and a 
tactical scenario may be connected to one or several strategic scenarios but the 
relation is not necessarily as simple as a tactical scenario being part of a strategic 
scenario. 
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Tactical scenarios constructed to be used in combination with a strategic scenario may 
be very simple and contain fewer descriptors compared with more elaborate tactical 
scenarios used for e.g. exercises… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. A scenario structure distinguishing between strategic and tactical core scenarios 
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l sourc
e (mas
titis) o
r 
intenti
onal re
lease 
8 S
vinarp
 Salmo
nella 
Salmon
ella en
terica 
Pigs 
Feed o
r wild b
irds 
n.a. 
Accide
nt A
 reoccu
rring b
iotracin
g- scen
ario an
alogou
s to 
intenti
onal re
lease in
 food o
r feed. 
9 A
irborne
 anthra
x 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s*
 
Human
 
Air 
Activis
t/ 
Animal
 rights 
Overt 
Attack 
on hum
ans wit
h zoon
otic age
nts from
 a 
veterin
ary ins
titute l
aborat
ory. 
10 T
witter 
attack 
Salmon
ella en
terica 
/zoono
tic viru
s* 
Human
 
Food S
imulate
d 
Activis
t/ 
Climate
?? 
Simula
ted 
/hoax 
Simula
ted atta
ck with
 a  zoon
otic ag
ent as 
prime 
hypoth
esis. 
11 P
oisone
d dog 
Ethylen
e glyco
l 
Dog 
Water 
Neighb
or conf
lict 
Covert
 F
orensic
 scenar
io whe
re sym
ptoms 
could 
suppor
t intent
ional p
oisonin
g, disea
se or 
acciden
t. 
12 P
oisone
d racin
g horse
 
Seleniu
m 
Horse 
Feed/I
njectio
n 
Workin
g relati
ons  
Covert
 C
omplex
 forens
ic scen
ario wi
th alter
native 
cause o
f death
 and m
odus o
perand
i. 
13 A
nthrax
 in whi
te pow
der 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s 
Human
 
Milk su
bstitut
e in 
coffee m
achine
 
Private
 person
/ 
Hate ag
ainst a
uthorit
ies 
Overt 
 Forens
ic scen
ario: N
eed to 
rule ou
t that t
he 
agent w
as diss
eminat
ed in th
e produ
ction li
ne. 
14  R
aindee
r FMD 
Possibl
e FMDV
 
Reinde
er 
Unproc
essed h
eeds 
from in
fected 
animal
s Pr
ivate/ 
local co
nflict 
Covert
 
 
Police 
and mo
untain 
rescue
 team  
encoun
ters 
epizoo
tic agen
t under
 harsh 
environ
mental
 
conditi
ons 
15  M
issing s
trains 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s 
Cattle 
unknow
n 
unknow
n 
Covert
 A
ppeara
nce of a
nthrax
 at seve
ral farm
s. 
Pattern
 indica
tes inte
ntional
 releas
e 
Typing
 inform
ation c
ompar
ed with
 strains
 in 
stock a
nd stra
ins sen
t to oth
er labo
ratorie
s. 
Inform
ation o
n strain
s  in da
tabase 
deleted
 
 T
it
le
 
Ag
en
t 
Ta
rg
et
 
Ro
ut
e 
Ac
to
r/
m
ot
if 
Cl
as
s 
K
ey
 fe
at
ur
es
 
16 S
AMBIO
2013 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s 
Cows +
 
human
s 
Feed/ pastry 
pieces 
at a 
cafeter
ia and 
over 
napkin
s. 
Activis
ts/Rain
forest p
illage 
Initiall
y 
Covert
 
 
Attack 
at a fee
dmill a
nd at a
 cafeter
ia in a m
ajor 
store. U
nusual
 epidem
iology 
indicat
es 
bioterr
orism. 
Actor d
eclares
 respon
sible fo
r 
dissem
inating
 anthra
x witho
ut spec
ifying 
where 
or how
. Inform
ation s
haring 
betwee
n 
police 
and dis
ease co
ntrollin
g autho
rities is
 
essenti
al for in
vestiga
ting the
 crime 
and 
minimi
zing th
e conse
quence
s. 
17 O
vZoo 
High P
athoge
nic Avi
an 
Influen
za Viru
s (HPA
IV) 
Poultry
 + 
wild bi
rds 
Infecte
d birds
 
Activis
t/Anim
al welf
are 
Overt 
Letter 
to auth
orities 
indicat
ing tha
t HPAI 
has 
been d
issemin
ated at
 severa
l poultr
y farms
 and 
in wild
 bird po
pulatio
ns in m
ajor cit
ies. 
18 C
ovZoo 
High P
athoge
nic Avi
an 
Influen
za Viru
s (HPA
IV) 
Poultry
 + 
wild bi
rds 
Infecte
d birds
 
Activis
t/Anim
al welf
are 
Covert
 S
uspicio
n on HP
AI raise
d at six
 differe
nt 
poultry
 farms 
in diffe
rent pa
rts of th
e coun
try. 
Also hu
man ca
ses. Th
e virus
 has ca
pacity 
to be 
transm
itted be
tween 
human
s. 
19 N
obel Ba
nquet 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s 
Human
 
Food 
Activis
t/Anti 
animal
 trial 
Covert
  A
ttack o
n a ma
ss gath
ering e
vent w
hile 
acciden
ts and 
crises t
ake pla
ce in ot
her par
ts of 
society
. 
20 R
iot and
 social 
instabi
lity 
B
a
ci
ll
u
s 
a
n
th
ra
ci
s 
Human
 
Airbor
ne 
Activis
t/copy
cats 
Hoax 
Riot tri
ggers o
ther ex
tremist
s to thr
eaten 
govern
mental
 agenci
es. 
 
Task 1.1: Appendix 6
Task 1.1: Appendix 7
  Ta
sk
 1
.1
,A
pp
en
di
x 
7:
, U
se
r 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
fo
r 
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
 in
 A
ni
Bi
oT
hr
ea
t 
N
o 
Ac
ti
vi
ty
/u
se
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Co
re
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 fe
at
ur
es
 
Ai
m
 
Le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
ne
d 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
1 
Insider
 exerci
se 
Dec  20
11 
1 
 
Anthra
x outbr
eak in 
cows 
resultin
g from
 intenti
onal 
contam
ination
 of feed
. 
 
Suspec
t inside
r of the
 author
ity 
respon
sible fo
r epide
miolog
ical 
investi
gation.
 
 
 
Evalua
te func
tion of 
conting
ency 
plan in
 case o
f excep
tional e
vent  
(Anima
l bioter
rorism
) 
 
Evalua
te colla
boratio
n betw
een 
Veterin
ary ins
titute a
nd Poli
ce. 
 
 
Epidem
iologic
al inve
stigatio
n and c
rime 
investi
gation 
in para
llel cha
llenges
 
organiz
ation o
f work.
 
 
Valuab
le to in
volve t
op man
agemen
t in 
exercis
e. 
 
Joint ex
ercise b
etween
 securi
ty polic
e and 
veterin
ary ins
titute i
ncreas
es und
erstand
ing. 
 
A threa
t asses
sment 
may no
t be un
dertak
en 
and do
cumen
ted wh
en a no
rmal ou
tbreak
 is 
the pri
me hyp
othesis
. 
Deliver
able 4.1
, 
Append
ix x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Scenar
io work
shop 
at WP5
 meetin
g 
Dec 20
11 
1,3,5 
 
Confirm
 or reje
ct pres
ence of
 
anthra
x spore
s in fee
d (over
t/ 
hoax?)
. 
 
Is botu
lism ca
use of d
eath in
 
poultry
 (sabot
age?). 
 
Is Afric
an Swi
ne Few
er the c
ause 
of deat
h in wi
ld boar
s? (Ille
gal 
import
 of mea
t) 
 
Evalua
te abili
ty to in
terpret
 test 
results
 using v
alidatio
n repor
ts 
and res
ults fro
m qual
ity con
trol 
and co
ntrol sa
mples. 
 
Identif
y term
s and d
efinitio
ns 
related
 to ana
lysis of
 sample
s 
and qu
ality co
ntrol sa
mples 
 
 
Raised
 aware
ness ab
out the
 is intri
nsic 
uncerta
inty in 
analyti
c resul
ts  
 
Reveal
ed that
 differe
nt labo
ratorie
s have 
very 
differe
nt idea
s about
 which
 contro
ls are 
necess
ary and
 releva
nt.  
 
Should
 be foll
owed u
p by ad
ditiona
l WP1-
WP5 
worksh
ops 
 
Deliver
able 1.1
, 
Append
ix 11. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Scenar
ioforen
sic  
result e
valuati
on 
Jan 201
2 
8    
 
Were l
ivestoc
k killed
 by wil
d 
predat
or? 
 
Was fe
ed sour
ce of Sa
lmonel
la at 
farm?  
 
Introdu
ce fore
nsic ap
proach
 to 
result e
valuati
on to 
veterin
arians 
and 
microb
iologis
ts. 
 
 
The for
ensic a
pproac
h to res
ult eva
luation
 
seems 
applica
ble to p
atholog
ical and
 
epidem
iologic
al inve
stigatio
ns 
 
A comm
on stru
ctured 
approa
ch to re
sult 
evalua
tion co
uld pot
entially
 facilita
te 
collabo
ration 
betwee
n veter
inary a
nd fore
nsic 
institut
es whe
n inves
tigating
 biocrim
es. 
 
 
Deliver
able 1.1
, 
Append
ix 9. 
N
o 
Ac
ti
vi
ty
/u
se
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Co
re
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 fe
at
ur
es
 
Ai
m
 
Le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
ne
d 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
4 
Local/R
egiona
l 
Bioterr
orism 
Exercis
e – “Ex
er
ci
se
 
Sk
ån
e”
 D
ec
 2
0
1
1
 
9 
 
Animal
 welfar
e activi
sts wit
h 
motive
 to infe
ct hum
ans ins
tead 
of anim
als 
 
An ove
rt biote
rrorism
 attack
 in 
the city
 of Mal
mö 
 
 
Evalua
te gaps
 at the 
local an
d 
regiona
l level r
elated 
to 
bioterr
orism p
repare
dness 
 
Cooper
ation b
etween
 the 
local/r
egiona
l level a
nd the 
nationa
l level 
 
 
The ala
rm cha
in is cr
ucial 
 
Many a
gencies
 will be
 involv
ed 
 
Extrem
e medi
a press
ure 
 
Severa
l laws w
ill be u
sed at t
he sam
e time 
 
 
Declara
tion of 
a biote
rrorism
 attack
 will ta
ke 
place a
fter de
claratio
n of the
 diseas
e outbr
eak 
 
Forens
ic samp
ling of 
facilitie
s/build
ings  w
ill 
be diffi
cult sin
ce ther
e is a la
ck of sa
mplers
 
 
Tracing
 of (i) p
erpetra
tors, (ii
) 
microo
rganism
s, (iii) h
umans
 that ha
ve been
 
expose
d, (iv) r
umors 
and sp
eculati
ons  in
 
social m
edia. 
 FOI-R—
34
11
-S
E
, I
S
S
N
 
16
50
-1
94
2,
 a
pr
il 
20
12
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Social M
edia at
tack – 
Social M
edia 
Works
hop Se
p 2011
 10
 
 
Young 
 activis
ts and 
extrem
ists 
with m
otive to
 cause 
harm a
t 
govern
mental
 agenci
es 
 
A hoax
 scenar
io and 
all of a 
sudden
 people
 starts 
to repo
rt 
severe
 diarrh
eal illn
ess  
 
To trig
ger a re
sponse
 at 
govern
mental
 agenci
es 
 
To han
dle info
rmatio
n with 
uncerta
inty 
 
Lack of
 prepar
edness
 of soci
al med
ia incid
ents 
 
Commu
nicatio
n betw
een age
ncies is
 difficu
lt 
 
Lack of
 aware
ness ab
out the
 possib
ility of 
simula
ted atta
cks. 
 
Lack of
 knowl
edge on
 how to
 react o
n hype
r 
reporti
ng in so
cial me
dia. 
Works
hop in 
social 
media 
and its
 dual 
use in biopre
paredn
ess. In:
 
ISSN: S
VA´s Re
port 
Series 
17 ISSN
 1654-
7098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Works
hop: 
Evalua
tion of 
eviden
ce – 
patholo
gy, Sep
t 2012 
11,12 
 
Racing
 horse 
dead af
ter 
transpo
rt. Poss
ibly int
entiona
l 
intoxic
ation b
y selen
ium. 
 
The pa
thologi
st have
 to eva
luate 
alterna
tive hy
pothes
es 
regard
ing the
 cause 
of deat
h and 
route o
f seleni
um inta
ke. 
 
Evalua
te how
 the ap
proach
 for 
evalua
tion of 
eviden
ce from
 the 
Nation
al Fore
nsic In
stitute 
applies
 to a ca
se in ve
terinar
y 
patholo
gy 
 
The ap
proach
 is pote
ntially 
useful 
 
Presen
ting un
certain
ty as nu
mbers 
may be
 a 
useful 
tool to 
assess 
and ex
press t
he deg
ree of 
uncerta
inty bu
t there
 could 
be a da
nger if 
it 
gives a
 false im
pressio
n of cer
tainty. 
 
The ap
proach
 can se
rve as a
 tool to
 structu
re 
and do
cumen
t the re
asonin
g. 
 
Repres
enting 
a patho
logy ca
se as a 
Bayesi
an 
networ
k is not
 simple
 since n
either t
he 
hypoth
eses no
r the ob
served
 results
 are 
indepe
ndent. 
Deliver
able 1.1
, 
Append
ix 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
Exercis
e. Evalu
ation 
of evid
ence in
 
Bioterr
orism 
sampli
ng, Nov
 2012 
 
13 
 
Human
s infect
ed by B
 anthra
cis 
via mil
k subst
itute. 
 
Actor c
laims t
o have 
contam
inated 
produc
tion lin
e. 
 
To asse
ss whe
ther cu
rrent 
method
s can b
e used 
to decl
are 
a site fr
ee from
 a biolo
gical 
agent. 
 
Routin
es are n
eeded 
to docu
ment d
ecision
s, 
assump
tions a
nd calc
ulation
 underl
ying th
e 
plannin
g and e
valuati
on and
 to ensu
re that
 
messag
es are c
orrectl
y unde
rstood
. 
 
Manda
tes and
 respon
sibilitie
s in rel
ation to
 the 
reporti
ng of e
videnc
e need
s to be 
clarifie
d. 
  
Deliver
able 1.1
, 
Append
ix 8. 
Task 1.1: Appendix 7
Task 1.1: Appendix 7
N
o 
Ac
ti
vi
ty
/u
se
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Co
re
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 fe
at
ur
es
 
Ai
m
 
Le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
ne
d 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
8 
Decisio
n maki
ng 
worksh
op nr 1
 
Mar 20
12 
9 
   An
imal w
elfare a
ctivists
 with 
motive
 to infe
ct hum
ans. 
  Ov
ert bio
terrori
sm atta
ck in 
stockh
olm. 
Identif
ying ne
eds for
 decisio
n 
makers
 during
 bioter
rorism
 
inciden
t 
Coordi
nation 
of infor
mation
 is cruc
ial 
 Many o
rganiza
tions a
re invo
lved 
 Decisio
n maki
ng will
 take p
lace at 
many l
evels. 
AniBio
Threat
 
bridgin
g 
compe
ndium 
month
 
1-18. In
: ISSN: 
SVA´s 
Report
 Series
 17 ISS
N 
1654-7
098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
Outdoo
r secur
ity 
trainin
g 
14 
 
Lonely
 activis
t 
  Co
ntamin
ate the
 water 
supply
 
intende
d for re
indeer
 using 
unproc
essed h
eed fro
m wild
 
boar  
 
Foot an
d mout
h disea
se 
 
 
Caught
 up in a
n avala
nche 
Joint t
raining
 with 
local p
olice, d
og 
unit  an
d moun
tain res
cue tea
m 
 How d
oes la
w enf
orceme
nt wo
rk 
with o
nly ba
sic kn
owledg
e of B
- 
agens?
  Identif
y prob
lems w
orking
 with 
B 
agens 
in seve
re con
ditions
 such 
as 
snow, w
ind and
 low te
mperat
ures  
  
Regula
r police
men ne
ed mor
e B trai
ning to
 be able
 
to wor
k safely
 with B
 -agens
 
 Proper
 decon
tamina
tion of 
equipm
ent and
 dogs  i
s 
adequa
te 
 SOPS is
 neede
d for B
 events
 
 Correc
t inform
ation fr
om the
 call ce
nter to
 the 
police?
 
 This is 
a possi
ble sce
nario- 
the viru
s can e
asily 
spread
 unless
 proper
 action
s are ta
ken.  
 
AniBio
Threat
 Third 
annual
 meetin
g 
compe
ndium.
 In: 
ISSN: S
VA´s Re
port 
Series 
17 ISSN
 1654-
7098) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decisio
n maki
ng 
worksh
op nr 2
 
Sep 20
12. 
17, 18 
Comple
x scena
rio 
Overt a
nd cov
ert 
 
Study a
larm pa
thways
 and ra
pid 
alert pr
ocedur
es 
 
Compa
re over
t and c
overt 
attacks
. 
 
Many o
rganisa
tions b
ecome 
involve
d 
 
Forens
ic awar
eness i
s often
 low am
ong pu
blic 
and an
imal he
alth or
ganisat
ions 
Holmd
ahl, L. G
ranelli,
 
K, Lore
ntzon, 
P, 
Daniels
son, C, 
Knutss
on, R., M
uren, 
S.  LRN 20
11-1. In
: ISSN: 
SVA´s R
eport S
eries 
17 ISSN
 1654-7
098) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
Decisio
n maki
ng 
exercis
e 
Nov 20
12 
19 
 
Multip
le incid
ents in
 society
 
must b
e mana
ged 
simulta
neousl
y 
 
Many h
umans
 infecte
d 
 
High m
edia im
pact 
 
Train d
ecision
 maker
s from 
discipl
ines  to
 manag
e 
bioterr
orism a
ttack 
 
Differe
nt auth
orities 
focus o
n differ
ent asp
ects 
 
Lack of
 overal
l persp
ective 
 
Difficu
lties to
 coordi
nate de
cision m
aking 
 
The po
lice wa
s assoc
iated in
to netw
ork of 
author
ities m
anagin
g zoono
tic inci
dents. 
Task 3
.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Strateg
ic 
Commu
nicatio
n 
worksh
op 
- 
- 
 
 
Study c
ommun
ication
 strateg
y 
 
Who ta
kes the
 lead d
uring 
bioterr
orism i
nciden
t with B
-
agens. 
 
Commu
nicatio
n plans
 are no
t coord
inated 
Task 3
.1/3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o 
Ac
ti
vi
ty
/u
se
r 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Co
re
 
sc
en
ar
io
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 fe
at
ur
es
 
Ai
m
 
Le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
ne
d 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
12 
SHARE
 SEC Ex
ercise 
Mar 20
13 
15 
Missing
 strains
 and de
leted 
inform
ation c
alls for
 transa
ction 
analysi
s 
 
Study e
xchang
e of inf
ormati
on 
during
 incide
nt 
 
Differe
nt lega
l frame
works 
may co
llide 
 
Need to
 impro
ve colla
boratio
n with 
law 
enforce
ment/p
olice. 
Task 2
.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
SAMBI
O2013
 
1
6
 
 
Enviro
nmenta
l activi
st with
 
motive
 to harm
 both a
nimals
 
and hu
mans. 
 
Starts w
ith see
mingly
 unrela
ted 
cases in
 human
s and c
ows. 
 
The mo
tive is t
o get at
tention
 
becaus
e of the
 impor
t of cer
tain 
raw ma
terial a
nd how
 the rai
n 
forest i
n South
 Ameri
ca is be
ing 
destroy
ed. 
 
Outbre
ak inve
stigatio
n meet
s 
crime i
nvestig
ation. 
 
 
Identif
y probl
ems co
ncernin
g 
collabo
ration 
betwee
n 
organiz
ations 
respon
sible fo
r 
coordin
ation, l
aw enf
orceme
nt 
author
ities an
d autho
rities 
respon
sible fo
r preve
ntion o
f 
commu
nicable
 diseas
es on 
nationa
l level (
table-t
op 
exercis
e) 
 
 
Coordi
nated e
pidemi
ologica
l 
and for
ensic in
vestiga
tion (fi
eld 
trainin
g exerc
ise). 
 
Ta
bl
e-
to
p 
ex
er
ci
se
 
 
Author
ities re
sponsib
le for la
w enfo
rcemen
t, 
commu
nicable
 diseas
es and 
coordin
ation h
ave 
differe
nt role
s and r
espons
ibilities
, which
 may 
lead to
 conflic
ts betw
een ob
jective
s 
 
Author
ities in
volved
 need t
o find c
ommon
 
guideli
nes on 
how to
 handle
 the sh
aring o
f 
inform
ation a
nd coo
rdinate
d decis
ion-ma
king.  
 
Severa
l netwo
rks are
 establi
shed th
at have
 
differe
nt appr
oaches
 and fo
cus. In 
case of
 
unusua
l event
s new m
embers
 may b
e inclu
ded 
in the e
stablish
ed netw
orks. 
 
Unders
tanding
 the leg
al fram
ework 
for sha
ring 
secure
 inform
ation is
 crucia
l. 
Fi
el
d 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
 
Legal f
ramew
ork mu
st be u
pdated
 to pro
mote 
efficien
t work
 in hot 
zone 
 
Routin
es for s
haring 
inform
ation a
t the sc
ene 
of crim
e/dam
age are
 neede
d. 
 
The tec
hnical 
system
s for sh
aring in
format
ion 
could b
e impr
oved. 
 
A furth
er harm
onizati
on of m
ethods
 and 
equipm
ent use
d by di
fferent
 organi
zations
 at a 
scene o
f crime
/dama
ge wou
ld be b
enefici
al. 
 
Counti
ous tra
ining a
nd exe
rcising
 is esse
ntial. 
Task 6
.3 
 Evalua
tion re
port (in
 
prepar
ation) 
fråga 
Ekelöv
 om na
mn.. 
14 
Legal a
dvisory
 
networ
k meet
ing 
May 20
13 
 
Riot an
d Socia
l instab
ility tri
gger 
other a
ctivists
 
Threat
s again
st auth
orities 
during
 
handlin
g of rio
ts. 
Table t
op exer
cise 
 
To imp
rove aw
arenes
s about
 
legal ch
allenge
s assoc
iated w
ith 
riots an
d bioth
reats 
 
Curren
t legisla
tion do
es not 
suppor
t efficie
nt 
early w
arning 
 
Curren
t legisla
tion is 
not sup
porting
 
collabo
ration 
betwee
n agen
cies an
d discip
lines 
in this 
kind of
 incide
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Report from tabletop exercise 
– evaluation of results
Results are reported as restricted (Annex X). 
The annex has been classified in accordance 
with the Swedish law “Offentlighets- och 
sekretesslagen (SFS 2009:400)”: Chapter 15, 
§ 1, Chapter 15, § 2, and Chapter 18, § 13.
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WORKSHOP IN EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE, JAN 26 2012 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Summary 
2. Description of the scenario and outcome. 
3. Original slides from workshop (In Swedish). 
4. Summary of evaluation (In Swedish). 
 
1. Summary 
 
A workshop in evidence evaluation was arranged at SVA in collaboration with SKL. 
Approximately 25 participated from SVA representing epidemiology, pathology, 
microbiology, virology and chemistry. There was also participants from FOI and SLU. 
The aim was to give an introduction to forensic evaluation of results and discuss how 
methodology from SKL can be applied to scenarios relevant for SVA. The workshop is 
part of a process to improve the ability of SVA to write forensic reports for courts and 
and decision makers.  The expected outcome is more structured reports where results 
are evaluated in relation to explicitly defined hypotheses. 
The day started with lectures where Birgitta Rasmusson (SKL) explained how 
evaluation of results is conducted as SKL using examples from pathology and 
epidemiology. Anders Nordgaard (SKL) gave an introduction to the Bayesian 
framework for evaluation of results used at SKL and to the scales used to report how 
strongly the result supports a hypothesis. 
In the afternoon the participants worked in groups evaluating results from a 
hypothetical scenario focusing on Salmonella on a pig farm. Sampling and typing 
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results were combined with expert knowledge to produce a statement on how strongly 
the results supported introduction of Salmonella via the feed supplier versus 
introduction via wild animals.  
Most participants found the working methodology useful and applicable to cases at 
SVA and recommended to follow up by additional workshops focusing on other 
scenarios representing activities at SVA.  
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 2. Description of the scenario and outcome. 
The workshop scenario focused on the investigation of a feed –borne outbreak of 
Salmonella in a Pig-herd. After discovery of Salmoenlla in the herd the farmer accuses 
the feedmill of haveing delivered salmonella contaminated feed. However, the feedmill 
denies liability and states that there are other sources of contamination, including wild 
birds, rodents, locally produced crops and visitors. 
 
Evidence in the form of results from sampling at the feedmill and farm, typing of 
isolates (PFGE) and the salmonella status of other farms that bought feed from the 
same feedmill were presented as « fact cards » when the participants requested the 
information.  
 
The scenario was presented as a slideshow in Swedish. Se illustrations below. The 
scenario was used to construct a draft Bayesian Belief Network illustrating the relation 
between pieces of evidence (Fig 1).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Draft of Bayesian Belief Network based on the workshop scenario. A 
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3. Original slides from workshop (In Swedish) 
 
(1)Inledande händelser
• Lymfknuta från eko-gris slaktad vid slakteriet i 
Svinarp positiv för Salmonella Typhimurium
fagtyp DT40
• Vid provtagning på gården återfinns smittan
• Utökad provtaging av gården inleds.
(2) Inledande händelser, forts
Resutat av utökad provtagning (träckprover)
Suggor (inomhus) 0/30 prov positiva
Individuella träckprover
Ekogrisar (utomhus) 7/30 prov positiva 
(Typh. DT40)
Samlingsprover –plock. Motsv 300 grisar)
(3) Har grisarna smittats via foder
• Gården har köpt pelleterat koncentrat. Blandar med egen 
spannmål. Separata system för ekogrisfoder o suggfoder.
• Provtagning av gårdens fodersystem negativ för Salmonella 
(0/30) i vardera suggfoder, o ekosvinfoder) 
– SJVprovtagningsinstruktion: 5*silotopp spannmål (Plåtsilo); 
5*silotopp koncentrat; 5* intag; 5*torrfoderblandare;5*spill i 
foderhus; 5* silotopp färdigfodersilo.
• Provtagning av stallmiljö. 25 prover hos vardera suggor o 
ekogrisar. Positivt prov i foderautomat hos ekogrisar (1/5) 
samt dammprov i stallmiljö (1/5 ) (Typhimurium XXX).
(4)Har det funnits Salmonella hos 
foderlevernatören?
• Fem månader tidigare hittades Salmoenlla Typhimurium DT40 i prover 
från elevatorfot (före värmebehandling) vid foderfabriken i Svinarp.
• Vid uppföljning var 1 av 35 prover positiva (Provtagning längs 
produktionslinjen) för Typhimurium DT40. Också ett fynd av Salmonella 
Senftenberg gjordes.
• Efter sanering provtogs anläggning av Jordbruksverket. Ingen Salmonella 
hittades (0/40)
• Samma stam (DT40 ) hittats en månad senare i råvarukontroll av ekologisk 
solroskaka (råvara i ekofoder) importerad från Ungern.
• Salmonella Typhimurium är relativt ovanlig i foderprover. Kan delvis bero 
på att den är svårare att isolera. DT40 har ej tidigare hittats hos 
fodertillverkare.
 
(5) Finns Salmonella hos 
foderleverantören idag?
• Efter fyndet på gården utanför Svinarp provtas
foderfabriken. Prover tas från linjen före 
värmebehandling samt på ekofoder-linjen efter 
värmebehandling (n=40) och från 
utlastningsprover(n=10). Inget fynd av Typhimurium
DT40. 
• Ett prov taget före värmebehandling är positivt för S 
Yoruba. 
• Efter ny sanering provtas anläggningen igen. Inga fynd 
av Salmonella (n=40)
(6) Finns Salmonella i grannskapet och 
hos andra köpare av foder?
• Inga fler fynd gjordes på slakteriet.
– Endast enstaka prover av lymfknutor tas  genom 
kontroll program. Ej troligt att Salmonella skulle 
hittats hos grisar från granngård även om smittan 
funnits. 
• Salmonella har inte hittats på andra gårdar med 
samma leverantör). (30 gårdar varav 10 med 
ekogrisar). 
– Provtagningen har endast utgjorts av utlastnings-
prover av foder (två 25g prov per leverans).
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(7) Kan salmonella förts in via djur eller 
fåglar? 
• S typhimurium DT40 förekommer hos tättingar i Sverige o Europa. Denna fagtyp är 
den dominerande hos svenska småfåglar. Data saknas på hur vanligt det är att 
fåglar är smittade
• I 13 av de 31 gårdar där Salmonella typhimurium hittades under 1993-2010 var 
fagtypen DT40. 
• Totalt hittades Salmonella i  54 svinbesättningar  under 93-2010
• S typhimurium DT40 är ovanligt hos andra djur (Hittats hos katter vid fågelbord)
• S typhimurium DT40 har inte tidigare hittats hos lantbruksdjur i trakten(ej heller 
undersökt)
• Gnagare o husdjur på gården har ej undersökts.
(8) Kan människor fört in Salmonella 
till gården?
• Några fall (En vuxen 3 barn) av S typhimurium DT40 rapporterades 
från människa tidigare under året (7 månader sedan) Bland annat 
en familj i Svinarp. Smittkällan antogs vara familjens katt som ätit 
småfåglar vid fågelbordet.
• Dessa personer har inte besökt gården men varit i skogen intill.
• S Typhimurium DT40 utgör inte mer än högst 0,2-0,4% av alla 
svenska Salmonellafall. Främst barn.
– (gissning utifrån source attribution)
• Inga personer med symptom liknande Salmonella har besökt 
gården under det sista året.
(9) Kan prover från foderfabriken ha 
kontaminerats på laboratoriet?
• I samband med utredningen av humansmitta analyserades 
salmonella Typh DT40 på SVA (från katten).  Detta gjordes ca tre 
veckor innan det första fyndet av Typhimurium DT40 på 
foderfabriken,
• Efter detta gjordes också en pulsfält analys av olika isolat av 
typhimurium DT40 (ca 3 månader innan utredningen av utbrottet 
hos svin)
• Analys av humanprover & subtypning utfördes vid SMI.
• Proverna från gården och foderanläggningen i Svinarp analyserades 
av Eurofins och isolerad Salmonella serotypades på SVA. Isolaten 
fagtypades vid SMI.
(10) Är det verkligen samma klon på 
fabriken och på gården. (MVLA)
• Multilocus Variable-Number Tandem-Repeat Analysis. 
Analyserar 5 loci. 
• Upplösning anses vara i klass med fagtypning (generellt 
påstående i abstract..) . Upplösning inom fagtyp är 
oklar…
• Perfekt överensstämmelse mellan isolat från lymfknuta 
gård o fabrik. (typ 3-12-9-14-211)
• Humanisolatet avviker (3-12-12-14-212)
(11) Är det samma klon i fabriken som 
på gården. Pulsfält gel elektrofores (PFGE)
• Identiska isolat från lymfknuta & gård 
• Ett band saknas i fabriksisolatet. (nästa bild)
• Humanisolatet avviker i flera band
• Den aktuell PFGE-typen tycks inte vara helt ovanlig bland 
fåglar i Sverige
• viss ”evolution” av PFGE-typ kan ske under utbrott.
• Oklart hur stor variationen i PFGE-typ är inom DT40
(12) Är det samma klon i fabriken som 
på gården. Pulsfält gel elektrofores (PFGE)
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(13) Vad skulle få er att ändra er 
uppfattning?
– Ett fynd av salmonella typh DT40 gjorts i gårdens fodersystem för Ekogris-
foder. (1/5 prover från silotopp – pelleterat koncentrat)
– Salmonella typh DT40 återfunnits vid undersöknineng av foderfabriken i 
samband med utbrottet (Före värmebehandling. 1 positivt av 40 )
– Om 100 negativa prover analyserats från utlastat Ekogris foder (inkl flera 
gårdar) och 10 negativa prover tagits från silotopp på gård (pelleterat 
ekofoder) – i samband med utredning av gårdssmitta.
– Det inte fanns någon avvikelse mellan pulstyp från gård och foderfabrik
– Humanisolatet från Svinarp haft samma pulstyp som den i svinen.
– Ytterligare en gård i trakten med eko-grisar visats vara smittad med 
Typhimurium DT40 och samma pulstyp.
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4. Result from evaluation of workshop, SVA/SKL, 2012-01-26  
(from ABT2011-WP1-14) 
 
Totalintryck av seminariet? (1-5, där 5 är mycket bra) 
4555555455 
Kommentarer :  
Bra introduktion 
Mycket bra föreläsningar - tankeväckande 
Intressant o givande. Gav många tankvärda aspekter till ämnet 
 
Lärde du dig mycket? (1-5 där 5 är “Ja mycket”!) 
5555545545 
Kommentarer :  
Jag lärde mig mycket ock det låg på en bra nivå. 
Detta ger bra struktur tankemässigt i utredningar 
 
Kursledarnas kunskaper i ämnet? (1-5 där 5 är mycket goda) 
5555555555 
Kommentarer :  
Bra. Det gick att översätta frågeställningar mellan dicipliner 
SKL har verkligen en gedigen kunskap i ämnet med många rutiner som SVA borde ta 
efter 
 
Planering och genomförande av seminariet? (1-5 där 5 är mycket goda) 
45545555555 
Kommentarer :  
Allt bra! 
Ngt mer tid för diskussion skulle behövas i anslutnign till presentationer 
Bra 
Bra 
bra mix av exempel, föreläsningar och grupparbeten. 
 
 
 
Hur upplevde du arbetsprocessen under grupparbetet? 
 
Ngt spretig till en början men tydlighet uppnågges under arbetets gång. 
 
Lite svårt, behövde guidning i processen och hur arbetet skulle läggs upp -> drivs 
framåt. 
 
Givande. Kul med så många kompetenser 
 
Kreativ, engagerad 
 
Verkar användbar och i grupp med experter från olika områden styrker den svaret. 
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OK men lite rörig. Fokus tappades ofta och man fastnade i detaljerna. Tror att 
scenariot var lite komplivcerat som startscenario 
 
(ej med) 
 
Intressant! Vi lyckades använda förmiddagens information om hur man arbetar 
igenomett fall. Frågor uppstod men dessa löstes vartefter av experterna som guidade. 
 
Något trög 
 
bra 
 
Först lite trevande, och så saknade vi lite kompetens, men det blev bra och vi hade bra 
diskussioner. Kräver lite träning att tänka i dessa banor. 
 
 
Hur upplevde du de scenarior som användes  (realism (1-5), relevans(1-5)? 
Föreläsningsexempel EHEC   3454?       4554? 
Föreläesningsexempel Vilt:           445245554?       4453455544? 
Grupparbetsseminarium Salmonella:        54544?554?      5454455544? 
  
Kommentarer? 
Är inte veterinär och har svårt att avgöra realism o relevans men det varr mycket bra 
att jämföra ”enkla brott” med ”sva problem” för att lättare förstå hur hypoteser skall 
ställas upp. 
Har ingen kunskap att bedöma detta, men jag tyckte fr a viltexemplet var väldigt 
talande. 
 
 
 
Vilken del av seminariet var mest användbar?  
Se att det finns många likhetet med arbete-arbetsgång SVA-SKL 
 
Grupparbetet gav mycket, men föreläsningarna gav verktyg far att klara av övningen 
 
Grupparbetet 
 
Föreläsnignarna 
 
Tyckte överlag att det var ett intressant seminarium som kan vara användbart 
framöver. Känns som om man hade velat ha ännu mer information. 
 
Diskussionerna. –Men viktigt med grunderna.. 
 
Föreläsning från SKL 
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Sättet att tänka, som säkert kan appliceras på andra områden i SVA:s verksamhet 
också. 
 
 
Vilka delar av seminariet skulle kunna förbättras?  
Lite trögt i hur grupparbetet skulle genomföras 
 
Just nu tid till reflerktion 
 
Kanske börja med några korta resultatövningar i ökande svårighetsgrad i ställe tför ett 
stort 
 
Öppning på eftermiddagen – bättre fördelning av experter. 
 
Förmiddagen 
Jag tror att uppdelningen i grupper var något olycklig då grupp2 fick trögare diskussion. 
Se till att det vid grupparbetena finns de kompetenser som krävs för att det ska blir ett 
realistiskt tänk. 
 
 
Finns det behov av att följa upp med fler seminarier/kurser?  
(Om “ja” - Förslag på focus?) 
Ja, fortsatt typfall från SVAs verksamhet 
JA 
Ja 
Ja – diagnostik. 
Ja, genom att försöka implementera ett liknande arbetssätt på SVA, självklart anpassat 
efter SVAs förhållanden 
Ja, kanske fr a i en misstanke utbrott/utredningssituation, men säkert även för andra 
delar. Måste fundera mer på det. 
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WORKSHOP IN EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE IN CASES 
INVOLVING VETERINARY PATHOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 
National Veterinary Institute (SVA). Sept 12 2012. 
 
Gunnar Andersson, Therese Ottinger 
 
Abstract 
In a collaborative project between SVA and SKL we are investigating the possibility of 
applying the Bayesian approach to forensic evidence evaluation to pathology. The aim 
is that statements from the veterinary institute should be correctly understood in cases 
of animal abuse, poisoning or intentional dissemination of pathogenic microorganisms. 
The workshop focused on evaluation of evidence in pathology cases involving suspect 
poisoning of animals. The scenario was based on a real incident where polo ponies 
were intoxicated with a lethal dose of selenium. During the progress of the workshop 
the participants were presented with clinical symptoms and findings from necroscopy 
and chemical analyses and were asked list the alternative hypotheses on the cause of 
death and propose further investigations.  
After that an attempt was made to represent the knowledge in the form of a draft 
Bayesian Belief Network. Representing the case as a Bayesian network was not 
simple since neither the sets of hypotheses nor the different observed results were 
independent. The process was found to be useful as a way to structure the information 
but whether the Bayesian belief network is an appropriate way of representing the 
process is still an open question. 
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Introduction & Background 
 
Evaluation of forensic evidence is an important part in the reconstruction of a possible 
CBRN incident. In recent years the state of the art in forensic interpretation is to 
evaluate forensic evidence using likelihood ratios in the framework of Bayesian 
hypothesis testing. In framework it is used to evaluate to what extent results from 
forensic investigation speak in favor of the prosecutors or defendants hypotheses. This 
framework is currently used at the Swedish national forensic institute (SKL). However, 
in the aftermath of a CBRN incident other institutes with less experience in forensic 
investigation will contribute to the investigation. In order to promote a joint approach to 
evaluation and reporting of results a series of workshops was initiated in collaboration 
between AniBioThreat tasks 1.1, 4.2 and 4.3. In the AniBioThreat project the 
framework of forensic statistics has been applied to veterinary forensic pathology, 
tracing of pathogenic microorganisms and post mortem interval estimation by forensic 
entomology.  
The work was co-funded by a 2-4 grant from the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency 
(MSB) “MSB-Säkprov”.  
 
The aim of the workshop was stated as: 
“To give an introduction to forensic evaluation of evidence and through 
discussions learn how a forensic approach can be applied to questions 
relevant for a veterinary institute and more specifically when results from 
sampling and chemical analyses should be part of the pathologists´ 
report”. 
 
A summary of the workshop program is given in table 1.  
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Table 1. Workshop program. 
Tid Activity Speaker Subject 
09:00- 
09:15 
Introduction and 
Background 
Gunnar Andersson (SVA) 
Researcher 
Background to the work 
Introduction to the day 
Ongoing activities 
09:15-
9:30 
Forensic 
Pathology 
 
Therese Ottinger (SVA) 
 
Work on developing forensic 
pathology at SVA 
9.30-
10:00 Scenario metodik Gunnar Andersson (SVA) 
Expressing uncertainty in 
statements  
10:00-
10:15 Coffee break   
10:15- 
10:45 
 
11:00-
12:00 
Introduction to 
work 
 
Work in groups 
 
 
Therese Ottinger/Vera 
Galgan (SVA) 
 
Andersson, Nordkvist, 
Ottinger, Hård av Segerstad 
mfl. 
 
Background story.  
 
 
Phrasing questions and 
hypotheses. Identifying data 
need. 
 
12:00-
13:00 Lunch   
13:00-
14:30 Continued work 
Andersson, Nordkvist, 
Ottinger, Hård av Segerstad 
mfl. 
 
Evaluation of evidence 
Model construction 
Statements 
15:00-
15:30 Kaffe    
15:30-
16:00 Summary Gunnar Andersson (SVA) 
Presentation of results 
Discussion and questions 
Evaluation 
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Scenario summary 
Before writing the scenario a specification was made according to the AniBioThreat 
conceptual framework for scenario building (ABT2011-WP4-5). 
 
Scenario title: Evaluation of result, pathology chemistry 
• Aim/goal:  
– Evaluate how the approach for evaluation of evidence from the National 
Forensic Institute applies to a case in veterinary pathology 
• Actors:  
– SVA-pathology dept. SVA-chemistry, Statistician Decision maker (SJV?) 
 
• Threat/challenge:  
– Complex Multidisciplinary question.  
– The report should be transparent and comprehensive. 
 
• Capacity challenged:  
– Evaluation of evidence.  
– Communication  
 
• Tools: 
– Case data 
– Articles and Reference values 
– Software for Bayesian network construction 
 
• Core-scenario: 
–  Selenium intoxication of horse. 
– (This user scenario may be fitted to other core-scenarios as well) 
 
• Series of events:  
– ”act 1 
– Case presented. Initial observation. 
– ”Act 2 
– Report from necropsy 
– ”Act 3 
– Data from specific investigations including feed. 
– Act 4 
– Crime suspicion presented 
 
 
Scenario description 
The scenario was based on a real incident where polo ponies were accidently 
intoxicated with a lethal dose of selenium (Desta et al.). The clinical symptoms and 
findings from necropsyand chemical analyses are taken from this report whereas the 
frame story was modified to include additional hypotheses on cause of death and on 
the means of administrating the selenium to the horse. The scenario was represented 
as a slide show (Figure 1-3). At the beginning of the workshop the participants were 
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presented the introduction and the initial symptoms of the dead horse (Figure 1). When 
reaching the slide “Initial Hypothesis” (Figure 2) a discussion was initiated. During the 
course of the workshop participants requested analyses to be made, based on the 
hypotheses. The results from the analyses were presented as “fact cards” (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Introduction to the scenario and initial symptoms. 
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Figure 2. Initial questions to participants and additional information given in response to 
investigations proposed by participants. 
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Figure 2 - continued. Initial questions to participants and additional information given in 
response to investigations proposed by participants. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. References to original case presented to participants after the workshop. 
 
Progress of workshop: 
The presentation of initial symptoms and later the findings from the proposed 
investigations was followed by extensive discussion among participants. The 
discussion included: 
 Listing alternative hypotheses 
 Estimate probability of obtaining the different results under the hypotheses 
 Which hypotheses and results are independent? 
During most of the workshop the whiteboard was used to list hypotheses and results 
and to indicate the relation between them (Figure 4 left). Attempts were made to 
estimate the magnitude of probabilities (figure 4, right). The participants were often 
able to set an approximate estimate for the probabilities although it was explicitly 
agreed that the estimates were preliminary and could not be used to calculate the 
value of evidence without revision. 
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Figure 4. Screenshots from workshop. 
 
The following bullet points summarize the discussions. 
After presenting participants with case: 
 Points of discussion after seeing initial symptoms:  What diagnoses would be 
possible? 
 Heat stroke/hyperthermia. 
 Oxygen deprivation/entrapment suffocation. 
 Stress. 
 Cardiac arrest. 
 Disease. 
 Circulatory collapse. 
 Poisoning or failed doping. 
 Rupture of the aorta.  
Points of discussion after obtaining results from necropsy: 
 Bleedings in muscles- what does that mean?  Are they related to death or could it 
be normal for this population of horses especially after a stressful transport? 
 Absence of pathogenic bacteria – what does it mean? What findings would we 
expect in an animal that died from infection and an animal that did not? 
 Is it probable that an apparently healthy horse dies acutely of an infection? 
 Is it possible that one out of five horses dies from oxygen deprivation? What is the 
status of the other horses?  
Points of discussion after analysis of selenium: 
 Are we sure that these levels are lethal? 
 Could the observed levels be result from eating selenium? 
 If these levels where a result of eating high doses over a period of time - is it 
probable that the horse would show no symptoms of chronic selenium poisoning 
what so ever? 
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 Calculations on selenium level via feed – It is deemed impossible to reach 
measured levels by feeding a horse with the feed additives that were analyzed. 
 Chronic intoxication – Are the selenium levels compatible with the healthy 
appearance before transport… 
 Bleedings are in concordance with acute selenium but are they also in support… 
We would expect bleedings in case of high selenium doses but it may not be 
unexpected in a non-intoxicated racing horse after transport?? The bleedings may 
not be unexpected if oxygen deprivation, hyperthermia or stress is cause of death. 
 Do the high selenium levels rule out other disease? 
 Are we misled by the toxicology results? 
 
 
 
 
Representing scenario as a Bayesian Network 
After listing hypotheses and results an attempt was made to represent the knowledge 
in the form of a draft Bayesian Belief Network (Figure 5).  
 
  
Figure 5. Draft Bayesian network constructed during workshop. Left: Network with prior probabilities. 
Middle: Network after seeing the pattern from necropsy and negative bacterial culture. Left: Network after 
adding evidence from selenium analysis. 
 
Before necropsy there are seven groups of hypotheses judged equally 
probable.(Figure 5 left) The prior odds for The Hypothesis “The horse died from 
intoxication” is approximately 14/86 = 0.16. When evidence from necropsy and 
bacterial culture are inserted the odds have changed to 63/38=1.65. This corresponds 
to a value of evidence (Bayes factor) of 10.2 for the combined evidence of necropsy 
and bacterial culture and using the scale of conclusions from SKL the result speaks to 
some extent in favor of intoxication. (V>6).  
With addition of the observation “High Selenium” the odds will change strongly in favor 
of “intoxication” compared with “not intoxication” (Odds =0.99998/0.00012). It was 
discussed whether or not there was some, small, probability that the high selenium 
could have been a result of the horse being fed selenium containing additives, and not 
the cause of death. A quick calculation of the amounts of selenium that a horse could 
have taken up from feed indicated that the levels seen could not possibly have been 
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reached by feeding the selenium additive in question. It was also noted that if a horse 
had accumulated these levels by feeding it would have shown signs of chronic 
selenium intoxication before the transport. 
Consequently the combined result of a) the horse being healthy before transport, b) no 
signs of chronic selenium intoxication and c) extremely high levels of selenium in 
organs would be an expected result if the horse had been injected with a high dose of 
selenium just prior to transport. 
In contrast, these results would be very unlikely under the alternative hypotheses 
evaluated. 
Two main sets of hypotheses on activity level are identified.  
1: Hp= High levels of selenium the cause of death; Hd1 =Other cause of death (from 
list); Hd2, The high levels of selenium contributed to death by some of the causes, e.g. 
High selenium + stress.  
2: Hp= High levels of selenium caused by injection; Hd= levels reached by feeding. 
 
Observation during the workshop 
Validity of the network structure 
A general observation is that neither were the two sets of hypotheses independent, nor 
the observed results from different investigations. Representing the case as a 
Bayesian network is clearly not simple. However, interpreting results as being 
independent while they are not is one of the important fallacies in the interpretation of 
evidence (e.g. Aitken, Roberts & Jackson) and in order to judge how strongly the 
results support one of the hypotheses over another these questions need to be 
addressed. The complex interplay is illustrated in the hypothetical network in figure 6, 
which was constructed by the organizers after the workshop. However, there may be 
more efficient ways of representing this problem. 
Birgitta Rasmusson, SKL, observed that the process had similarities with that of e.g. an 
investigation of a fire where new hypotheses and pieces of evidence are added 
stepwise. Whether the network or influence diagram is an appropriate way of 
representing the process remains to be determined. 
 
Need for hard data versus qualified guess on probabilities 
Another point of discussion was whether or not is appropriate or not to set probabilities 
for results based on expert opinions/qualified guesses. The conclusion was that model 
building is a way of structuring data. Before actually collecting data it is necessary to 
identify relevant reference population. The estimated numbers of p(E|Hx) inserted in 
the BNN should be seen as preliminary. When the first conceptual analysis of the case 
is completed the critical parameters should be identified and their preliminary 
probabilities should be updated using literature data, data from relevant databases or 
possible from control experiments. Differences between human and veterinary 
pathology was discussed. One point was made that there might be fewer documented 
cases which the pathologist could use as reference. However, on the contrary the 
veterinary pathologist may instead have access to reference data based on animal 
testing for e.g. toxicity of substances or side effects of drugs. 
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Figure 6: Hypothetical network structure illustrating the complex interaction between hypotheses and 
results. The red nodes illustrate the activity level hypotheses related to cause of death and source of 
elevated selenium respectively. The orange node is the acute cause of death. 
 
 
What happens to alternative diagnoses? 
It was observed that some hypothesis will appear, be dropped and reappear again 
during the course of the investigation. Excluding a hypothesis in response to e.g. 
necropsy results is equivalent to setting the probability of the observed evidence given 
that hypothesis to zero. In a pathological investigation there will be a very large number 
of hypotheses which may be raised and dropped, some of which may be explicitly 
indicated. It will, for practical reason, not be possible to assign probabilities to all these 
hypotheses using data from databases or literature. Even providing an expert´s 
qualified guess to each hypothesis might be difficult. However, even though each 
hypothesis might be improbable their total probability might not be neglectable. 
Appropriate level of detail 
It was noted by the participants that in addition to the key hypotheses at activity level 
the problem may contain several sub-hypotheses.  A result of an investigation, 
particularly a micro- or macroscopic investigation, is a combination of an observation 
and interpretation. For example, when dissecting the kidneys of a dead animal crystal 
like structures may be observed which then could be interpreted as oxalate crystals. 
When evaluating probability of evidence a large number of oxalate crystals is a 
probable result in case of poisoning with ethylene glycol or certain plants whereas it is 
a very unlikely result under most other hypotheses.  
However, interpreting the morphological structure as, for example, an oxalate crystal 
may be influenced by the prime hypothesis (e.g. ethylene glycol poisoning). A formally 
correct evaluation should thus include the probability of observing a structure 
resembling oxalate crystals under the alternative hypotheses, until the identity of the 
crystals have been confirmed.  
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 Taking this to the extreme would probably result in an absurd BBNs and 
reports. However, the failure to reinterpret an observation retrospectively when 
faced with new facts or indices is a fallacy commonly observed among junior 
scientists probably as a result of how the human mind works (GA personal 
observation. However also senior experts may be influenced by a cognitive 
fallacies as pointed out in a lecture by I Dror at the EAFS2012 conference 
(plenary Aug 23). Consequently the order of appearance, and prior probabilities 
for the activity level propositions could potentially bias the interpretation of 
evidence in relation to identity level propositions…. 
(http://cognitiveconsultantsinternational.com/index.php?sub=drorspublist) 
Conclusions 
Result of evaluation 
At the evaluation the participant were asked for their opinion on the scenario and the 
approach for evaluating evidence in a forensic pathology  
The participant´s comments on the scenario: 
 Realism – good 
 Relevance – good. 
 Complexity – OK, this scenario is representative for the complexity of pathology cases 
– they are rarely simpler. 
The participant´s comments on the use of Bayesian approach: 
 Potentially useful, worth testing. 
 There were different views on the expression of value of evidence as numbers 
o  It could be a danger if it gives a false impression of certainty 
o It could be a useful tool to assess and express the degree of uncertainty. 
 The Bayesian networks could be useful for combining evidence from several 
investigations. 
 The approach can serve as a tool to document the reasoning. 
 It would be interesting to see how a court would look at it. 
 
The participants were asked if there is a contradiction between the formulation of 
working hypotheses and the ideal of “working without prior assumptions”. The 
participants asked where the statement comes from (First seminar on evaluation of 
evidence). Perhaps there is a difference between pathology and epidemiology when it 
comes to the method of working? ”. It was agreed that a pathologist can never look for 
everything and thus need to have some hypotheses that can tell them what to look for. 
It was agreed that it is advantageous to explicitly indicate all hypotheses and 
assumptions for traceability 
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Conclusions about process 
Setting numbers on probabilities is a two step process. The first estimate is preliminary 
and may be seen as a way of making implicit assumptions explicit. In this process it is 
also important to identify relevant reference populations.  A first analysis of the model 
will give an indication about what data would be the most important for the overall 
conclusion (sensitivity analysis). This may help the investigator to focus the data 
collection on the most significant data from the right reference population. 
Before the workshop the following steps were proposed: 
1. Define the question(s) to be answered 
2. Define main hypothesis and alternative hypotheses (differential diagnoses) 
3. Perform necropsy – macroscopic investigation 
i. Filter hypotheses – exclude irrelevant differential diagnoses 
4. Perform selected investigations 
i. E.g. Histopathology, chemical analyses, bacteriology. 
5. Evaluate results in the light of remaining hypotheses 
Based on the discussions the following, updated process was proposed: 
1. Define the question(s) to be answered 
2. Define main hypothesis and alternative hypotheses (differential diagnoses) 
3. Perform necropsy – macroscopic investigation 
i. Filter hypotheses – exclude irrelevant differential diagnoses 
4. Perform selected investigations 
i. E.g. Histopathology, chemical analyses, bacteriology. 
5. Perform selected investigations 
i. E.g. Histopathology, chemical analyses, bacteriology. 
6. Investigate the structure of the problem 
7. Identify relevant reference populations / reference data (Important!)  
8. Identify dependencies between results from different investigations. 
9.  Make preliminary estimate of probability of results given alternative 
hypotheses. 
10. Investigate which of the estimated probabilities will be most important for the 
value of evidence in the case (sensitivity analysis). 
11. Search literature/databases for data that can be used to justify or update 
estimates of probability. 
12. Estimate the value of evidence for remaining hypotheses. 
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Meeting report from Scenario workshop at the 
WP5 meeting at ANSES Dec 1 2011 
 
Aim and Background 
The workshop was part of the work in Task 1.1 with focus on terms and definitions and conceptual 
modeling.  
 
The specific aims were to: 
 Evaluate the ability to interpret test results using validation reports and results from 
quality control and control samples 
 Identify terms and definitions related to analysis of samples and quality control 
samples 
 
The workshop was a pilot activity in AniBioThreat and as such a further aim was to evaluate the 
applicability of the workshop format and the scenarios in achieving the goals. 
 
Before the workshop the specifications for a user-scenario “terms and definitions” were set by the task 1.1 
scenario group (Appendix 1). The user scenario was applied to sub-scenarios representing four different 
core scenarios focusing on (i) anthrax in feed,  (ii) poultry botulism, (iii) Swine Fewer in wild boars and (iv) 
unknown zoonotic viruses in water used for feed (Appendix 2) in a seminar in December 2011 by a 
working group formed by members from SVA, DTU, RIVM, SLU, CVI and ANSES. Each sub-scenario was 
divided into two acts. 
 
In act 1 the participants should: 
• Instruct sampler (no. and type of samples and control samples to take) 
• Perform risk assessment 
• Define scope and delimitations  
• Prioritize samples to be analyzed (order of samples, controls that should be 
included) 
 
In act 2 the results from sampling are ready and participants: 
 should interpret the results  
 explain the results and confidence therein to a decision maker  
 
The workshop started with a short introduction by Gunnar Andersson (SVA) representing AniBioThreat 
task 1.1. After that the attendants were divided in three groups named tasks 1, 2 and 3. One person in 
each group was appointed chairman and was given a more detailed introduction to the specific core 
scenario. Notes were taken with color pens on paper and transferred to computer by a secretary. Each 
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group worked for about 2 h after which the participants were gathered and results summarized in a 30 min 
session. 
 
Workshop Evaluation: 
In general, the participants found the workshop very useful as it identified a lot of questions for future work.  
The different groups had various concerns. It was concluded that the user scenario/instructions should 
define more precisely what to discuss in order to reach the specific goals in the set time. Several 
participants commented that if it would have been possible to identify technical requirements, had the 
discussions not been allowed to drift into other topics.   
 
All participants found the workshop very interesting, learning and worth to follow up. The information from 
the different groups should be summed up and followed up in a telephone meeting.   
 
Several participants commented that the workshop was very useful for raising awareness about the 
intrinsic uncertainty in analytic results and the problems with interpretation. The discussions also revealed 
that different laboratories may have very different ideas about which controls are necessary and relevant. 
One such aspect relates to the tradeoff between need for process controls and risks of contamination. The 
use of readily identified stimulants which may be used as process controls without causing problems with 
contamination and false positives was discussed. 
 
The question was raised whether more joint WP1 and WP5 workshops are needed. This question will be 
discussed later during the course of the project.  
 
Some practical issues were also brought up, such as the use of separates rooms should be preferable as 
the noise level was reported by Group 1 and 2 to be high when sharing one large meeting room. Eight 
participants per group worked well for the discussions. 
 
 
Scenario specific issues 
1. Anthrax in feed scenario: 
The anthrax scenario was deemed good. However, the participants identified the need for 
statistical expertise for being able to solve the problem related to planning of sampling.  
 
2. Poultry botulism scenario: 
The scenario discussions worked out well. Toxin and DNA detection were identified as 
crucial to continue to discuss. 
 
3. African Swine Fewer Virus (ASFV) in wild boars scenario: 
The scenario worked well. More defined scenarios are needed to sort out sampling and 
control needs. 
 
4. Unknown zoonotic viruses in water scenario 
This scenario was not studied due to limited time 
. 
 
Controls 
A discussion of the need for controls in the different parts of the analysis chain resulted in the identification 
of the following controls: 
 Process controls – remains to be defined but refers to the full analytic chain including pre-
enrichment steps. The relevant process control depends strongly in the analysis and scenario. 
 Assay controls – Controls for the detection method.  
 Full lab process control (Botulism) – preliminary term, needs to be defined in further work 
 DNA assay control (before DNA extraction) 
 Microbiological process controls vs. chemical (toxins) full process control. 
 DNA integration, false negative. 
 Control for checking DNA - Could be possible to link to forensic investigations.  
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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL 
WORKING GROUPS 
 
Scenario 1: Anthrax in feed 
Act 1. Background to identify samples and controls to use 
 
First we made the assumption that there were no validated methods to use. This is similar to the EHEC 
outbreak in 2011 where there was no validated method for the sample type to be analyzed. We identified 
the needs to include control in the analytical chain where particularly internal amplification control and 
process controls (the whole analytical chain) were considered important. 
 
We proposed to use a generic approach for samples that you do not known as it is impossible to validate 
every method for all possible sample types. However, clinical samples may be validated. A comparison of 
suspicious object /protocol with clinical validated methods was discussed. 
 
Next the aim of sampling was discussed. The analysis protocol might differ depending on the aim, e.g. 
forensic protocol, suspicious objects protocols and clinical sampling. The sampling strategies should be 
defined, e.g. by making a flow chart of the process. We also discussed how to define the feed silo in the 
scenario; is this a crime scene? 
 
Different sampling approaches were discussed next, including automated sampling and sampling of the 
sheep, cows and maggots. Resources for sampling should be defined; no. of persons, sampling kits etc. 
as well as the no. and type of samples to take. 
 
The need to specify the analytical methods was identified, e.g. which methods to use (visualize the 
analysis chain in a flow chart), controls to include (process control, PCR control). 
 
We discussed different possibilities to learn more from international expertise and reference laboratories 
and some contacts were identified, e.g. the OIE anthrax reference laboratories and the WHO anthrax 
reference laboratories. The Critical Reagents Program (CRP) has been established in the US. The CRP 
collection includes inactivated antigens of select agent, genomic materials from biothreat agents and 
monoclonal and polyclonal antibodies of biothreat agents (CRP, 2011). This could be interesting to look 
into further. Under the WHO anthrax reference laboratory Global Foodborne Infections Network, Region 
Specific Pathogens (Ba) and training courses were mentioned. A contact that we thought could be 
interesting to contact at the OIE Reference Laboratories was identified (Dr Elizabeth Golsteyn-Thomas, 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency.  Email: bett.golsteyn-thomasnspectioins.gc.ca). 
 
The need to run reference material was identified as crucial. We also discussed that a response team 
should be supplemented with statistical support and that the sampler (possibly a veterinarian) should be 
trained to sample adequately. 
 
Finally we summed up the discussions about the sampling, samples and controls: (i) the need for sampling 
should be defined, (ii) the resources for sampling should be clarified, (iii) the sampler is important, and (iv) 
the needs for process and internal controls. 
 
Terms for sampling was then discussed and some conclusions drawn: 
 All samples negative: it is certain that the level in the sample is below a level of contamination in 
the samples analyzed from the big sample. 
 One weak positive sample:  SOP on interpreting the PCR results needed, sample should possibly 
be rerun 
 Controls: Process controls, assay control should be included. 
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Act 2 
In this part of the scenario it was concluded that there is no “yes or no answer” and that odds should be 
used instead.  Terms for controls are available at the Forensic Institute and these should be investigated 
further. Finally the logistics considering sampling was discussed and a question about the throughput was 
raised. 
 
Future scenarios: 
The group suggested including the interpretation of a positive PCR result in future scenarios. 
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Scenario 2: Poultry botulinum 
 
Discussion botulinum scenario 
First, the scenario frame was changed into a more relevant case. The scenario has previously been 
described in the scenario work within the project. 
 
Next we discussed the different controls used by different labs and which ones are necessary to be able to 
answer the questions of the scenario as well as possible. In this context we first discussed a “process 
control”. This term was used by some to define a control that is included in the first step in the lab and then 
in every step along the process, and by others it was defined as a control included first in the DNA 
extraction process. We therefore suggest two different terms; a “full process control” = A control that is run 
along with (or in) the samples from the first step of the lab process and through the whole process, and  a 
“DNA process control”= a control that is run along with (or in) the samples from the step when the sample 
is prepared for DNA extraction and through the rest of the process. 
 
We also agreed that a “negative process control” is good to include; which in our case will be a tube with 
the media which is left uncapped through the whole preparation of enrichment procedure and cultivated 
along with the other samples. This control will tell us if there are contaminations in the lab or during the 
sample preparation. 
 
Next we discussed PCR controls. We had different names for positive PCR controls, but decided it would 
be good to use the ISO standards (e.g. ISO 22174) for this. We also discussed different Internal 
Amplification Controls (IACs) used in different methods and labs. 
 
Next, there was a discussion about validation of lab methods. All the different labs that participated in task 
5.2 use different protocols for enrichment, as well as for DNA extraction and PCR. We discussed the idea 
of making a spore preparation and dilute it down to below the detection limit and send these preps around 
to the different labs to evaluate if the same limit of detection is achieved. Many labs have used the same 
protocols for many years, and it could be a good opportunity to optimize the protocol. Perhaps change the 
enrichment broth or detection technique.  
 
Last, we discussed how many samples to analyze, both the number of samples to be collected, but also 
where and if replicates should be included. We felt that this discussion will have to be continued if we get 
sampling data, and the no. of replicates is a financial question for each lab, and is depending on the 
situation.  
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Scenario 3: ASFV in wild boars 
Unintentional spread of ASFV 
The scenario has previously been described in the scenario work within the project. 
Discussion during the workshop 
The need for a nucleic acid degradation control was the most discussed issue. This is especially important 
in order to establish the risk of false negatives while analyzing partially decomposed carcasses. 
 
Sampling in the environment and technical controls (sampling, extraction and detection) were discussed. 
Analytical pathways within the institutes were also disclosed for the participants. 
It was considered prudent to use an established standard method for detection (based on OIE methods, 
terrestrial manual etc.). This will then be modified with a protocol for establishing DNA integrity from the 
sample; forensic methods should be able to solve the problem. More work will be invested in a short 
literature study about the possibilities to adapt existing forensic methods for integrity tests to AniBioThreat 
perspectives.  
 
For act two the discussion centered on communication. The possibility of false negatives were also 
discussed (false positives are highly unlikely with the current methodology). Since the results will be similar 
to current results a new statement to stakeholders should not be needed (aka we should not fix something 
that works).  
 
Possible fallout from the work now is an additional method to establish DNA integrity in samples. 
Terminology for controls must be discussed so that consensus is reached within the project.  
Intentional spread of virus 
Discussion never entered the second scenario for time reasons.  
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